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ABSTRACT
The 2013 National Infrastructure Protection 
Plan represents the latest attempt to rectify 
a faltering program that has suffered from 
the absence of a viable risk measure. This 
article introduces an Asset Vulnerability 
Model (AVM) to overcome recognized 
challenges and provide strategic direction 
in the form of (1) baseline analysis, (2) cost-
benefit analysis, and (3) decision support 
tools. AVM is predicated on Θ, an attacker’s 
probability of failure based on research in 
game theory. The Θ risk formulation provides 
a unifying structure within the Department 
of Homeland Security by combining elements 
from the Risk Management Framework and 
National Preparedness System. But critical 
infrastructure is not the only means of 
domestic catastrophic attack. Thus this article 
also proposes a policy framework supported 
by game theory to extend AVM protection to 
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 
stockpiles. In this manner, AVM may account 
for protective investments and lead the nation 
towards a unified homeland security strategy. 
INTRODUCTION
The attacks of September 11, 2001, exposed 
the vulnerability of critical infrastructure to 
precipitating domestic catastrophic attack 
through asymmetric means.  In the intervening 
decade, the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) has struggled to develop a coherent 
infrastructure protection program. Various 
reviews reveal a program that is fragmented, 
uncoordinated, and adrift.  The central difficulty 
has been in developing a risk assessment 
formulation to adequately inform strategic 
investment decisions. Without an appropriate 
measure, DHS is unable to (1) assess current 
protective status, (2) evaluate future protective 
improvement measures, or (3) justify national 
investments. 
This paper examines current DHS 
infrastructure protection programs and the 
underlying challenges to developing an adequate 
risk assessment formulation. It then addresses 
these challenges before introducing an Asset 
Vulnerability Model (AVM) to overcome 
them and help provide strategic direction. 
It draws on insight from earlier research in 
game theory suggesting a coordinated defense 
for both critical infrastructure and domestic 
stockpiles of chemical, biological, radiological, 
and nuclear (CBRN) agents. It concludes by 
proposing a policy framework supporting 
interagency coordination protecting both sets 
of assets under a unified homeland security 
strategy.    
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
PROTECTION
On September 11, 2001, elements of the 
aviation infrastructure were exploited to attack 
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon 
representing seats of US economic and military 
power (The White House 2003, 8).1 Nearly 
3,000 people were killed and $41.5 billion 
suffered in damages.2  9/11 was a “wake-up 
call” to the catastrophic potential of critical 
infrastructure (The White House 2003, 5).3 
As a result, the 2002 Homeland Security Act 
made critical infrastructure protection a core 
mission of the newly created Department of 
Homeland Security.4 Today, the 2013 National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) guides 
this mission. At the heart of the plan is the 
Risk Management Framework (RMF), a five-
step process for identifying, prioritizing, 
applying, and evaluating infrastructure 
protection improvement measures.5 A 2010 
review by the National Research Council (NRC) 
determined that “DHS’s operationalization of 
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that framework—its assessment of individual 
components of risk and their integration into 
a measure of risk—is in many cases seriously 
deficient and is need of major revision.”6 Various 
other reviews support the NRC’s findings.
Starting with Step Two, “Identify 
Infrastructure,” the DHS Inspector General 
(IG) concluded that the National Asset Database 
contained “many unusual or out-of-place 
assets whose criticality is not readily apparent, 
and too few assets in essential areas and may 
represent an incomplete picture.” The assets 
in question included 4,055 malls, shopping 
centers, and retail outlets, 224 racetracks, 
539 theme parks and 163 water parks, 1,305 
casinos, 234 retail stores, 514 religious meeting 
places, 127 gas stations, 130 libraries, 4,164 
educational facilities, 217 railroad bridges, 
and 335 petroleum pipelines. Notably missing 
from the database were many other items from 
banking and finance and food and agriculture 
sectors.7  
In Step Three, “Assess and Analyze Risks”, 
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
found that less than 11 percent of DHS’ 
assessments were conducted on high-priority 
assets. According to the GAO, DHS conducted 
about 2,800 combined surveys over a two-year 
period from 2009 to 2011. Of these, GAO was 
able to identify 179 assessments conducted on 
high-priority assets. Because of discrepancies 
between lists, GAO acknowledged another 129 
assessments might also have been done on high 
priority assets.8 GAO acknowledged that DHS 
had little control over industry participation 
in the voluntary program, but also noted 
that DHS (1) had not developed institutional 
performance goals to measure owner/operator 
participation, nor (2) positioned itself to assess 
why some high-priority asset owners and 
operators declined to participate.9
Moreover, the Homeland Security Grant 
Program (HSGP) raised a furor in 2006 
when Wyoming received $28.34 per capita 
compared to $4.10 and $3.73 per capita for 
New York and California respectively. After 
the 9/11 Commission weighed in on the issue, 
and spurred by Congressional legislation, 
DHS undertook to develop a more risk-based 
approach for determining HSGP allocations. 
Accordingly, the 2007 HSGP grant guidance 
announced the adoption of the risk formula 
R=T*V*C where T is the likelihood of an attack 
occurring, V is the vulnerability to an attack, 
and C is the potential consequences of an 
attack. In applying the formula, however, DHS 
was unable to differentiate vulnerability across 
areas and states, and consequently assigned it 
a constant value of one.10 In effect, DHS treated 
all assets as equally vulnerable to make resource 
decisions about reducing vulnerability.
In Step Four, “Implement Risk Management 
Activities,” a 2011 Congressional Research 
Service (CRS) report indicated a lack of 
coordination between the RMF working “inside 
the perimeter” of critical infrastructure, and 
the National Preparedness System working 
“outside the perimeter” of critical infrastructure. 
According to the CRS report, 
It is not clear to what extent the NIPP process 
influences the allocation of resources to states 
and localities. DHS states that information 
contained in its list of high-priority sites is 
reviewed when making these grant allocation 
decisions. However, these grants are managed 
by FEMA, which apparently assesses risk 
independent of the NIPP.11 
Between 2001 and 2008, DHS gave 
approximately $12 billion to state and local 
governments to prepare for and respond to 
terrorist attacks and other disasters.  
A central question that may be asked is what 
has been the rate of return, as defined by 
identifiable and empirical risk reductions, 
on this $12 billion investment? It does not 
appear, however, that there is an established 
methodology to engage in such analyses, nor 
are the data sets necessary for such analyses 
well-developed.12
Indeed, the National Research Council 
[D]id not find any DHS risk analysis 
capabilities and methods that are yet adequate 
for supporting DHS decision making…  
Moreover, it is not yet clear that DHS is on 
a trajectory for development of methods and 
capability that is sufficient to ensure reliable 
risk analyses other than for natural disasters.13
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Developing an appropriate risk measure is 
essential to guiding homeland security strategy, 
without which it is impossible to (1) assess 
current status, (2) evaluate future measures, or 
(3) justify national investments. Furthermore, 
it is a requirement under the 1993 Government 
Performance and Results Act. That the 2014 
DHS budget justification to Congress does 
not include such measures for infrastructure 
protection indicates this is still a pertinent 
issue.14 The state of affairs is of such a concern 
that in February 2013 the Obama Administration 
issued Presidential Policy Directive 21 calling 
for a review and analysis of current efforts to 
advance “a national unity of effort to strengthen 
and maintain secure, functioning, and resilient 
critical infrastructure.”15 
RISK ASSESSMENT CHALLENGES
Among its conclusions, the National Research 
Council found that the DHS Risk Management 
Framework “is sound and in accord with 
accepted practice in the risk analysis field.”16 
Risk management is “a continual process or 
cycle in which risks are identified, measured, 
and evaluated; countermeasures are then 
designed, implemented and monitored to see 
how they perform, with a continual feedback 
loop for decision-makers input to improve 
countermeasures and consider tradeoffs 
between risk acceptance and avoidance.”17 
Where the NRC took exception was with the 
DHS risk assessment formulation R=f(T,V,C).18
Risk assessment “pertains to the quantification 
or measurement of identified risk and 
probabilistic assessment that certain risks will 
manifest themselves.”19 By one estimate, there 
are more than 250 proposed risk assessment 
methodologies for critical infrastructure 
alone.20 Ted Lewis wrote the textbook on risk 
analysis for critical infrastructure protection.21 
Lewis applies a threat-driven approach to risk 
assessment. Threat-driven methodologies 
begin with a predefined set of initiating events. 
A 2001 study indicated that 80 percent of risk 
assessment models are of the event- or threat-
driven variety.22 Threat-driven approaches are 
supported by decades of experience in safety 
and reliability engineering using logic trees, 
influence diagrams, causal loop diagrams, 
and other methods to model human-initiated 
events.23 According to McGill, “threat-driven 
approaches are appropriate for studying 
initiating events that are well understood 
and whose rate of occurrence can be reliably 
predicted from historical data; however, 
they ultimately fail to consider emerging or 
unrecognized threats devised by an innovative 
adversary….”24 In the insurance or financial 
sectors, the assessment of risk benefits from 
a rich and voluminous set of data which can 
be mined for patterns of historical behavior. 
While there are various governmental and non-
governmental databases on terrorism, these 
data sources are relatively less robust.25 The 
National Research Council concurs that “with 
respect to exceedingly rare or never-observed 
events, the historical record is essentially 
nonexistent, and there is poor understanding 
of the sociological forces from which to develop 
assessment techniques.” They concluded: 
“Thus, it will rarely be possible to develop 
statistically valid estimates of attack frequencies 
(threat) or success probabilities (vulnerability) 
based on historical data.”26
Altogether the 2010 National Research 
Council report cited ten challenges to 
developing a risk formulation adequate for 
guiding strategic investment decisions.27 In 
addition to the difficulty of making reliable 
threat predictions, the NRC cautioned against 
risk formulations that were either too simple or 
too complex. The problem with developing high 
fidelity risk models is the same lack of historical 
data that troubles threat estimation. In the 
absence of hard data, assumptions must be 
made. The more complex the model, the more 
assumptions must be made, compounding 
potential errors. The middle ground, 
recommended by the NRC, is to develop risk 
models that are “documented, transparent, 
and repeatable.”28 For the purpose of guiding 
strategic decisions, the risk formulation must 
also be comprehensive in scope. According to 
the NRC report, ”vulnerability is much more 
than physical security; it is a complete systems 
process consisting at least of exposure, coping 
capability, and longer term accommodation 
or adaptation.”29 In other words, the risk 
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 10 Article 1 (February 2014) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
White,  Unified HS Strategy 4
formulation should address all phases of 
disaster, currently identified in the FEMA 
Integrated Emergency Management System 
as prevent, protect, mitigate, respond, and 
recover.30 Similarly, the risk formulation needs 
to capture the broader effects of a disaster 
beyond the immediate damage. “DHS’s 
consequence analyses tend to limit themselves 
to death, physical damage, first-order 
economic effects, and in some cases, injuries 
and illness.”31 Ultimately, the effectiveness of 
any risk formulation is judged by its usefulness 
to decision makers in managing resources. 
According to the National Research Council, 
the attributes of a good risk analysis include 
the ability to (1) convey current risk levels, (2) 
support cost-benefit analysis, (3) demonstrate 
risk reduction effects across multiple assets at 
different levels of management, and (4) measure 
and track investments and improvement in 
overall system resiliency over time.32
The preceding summary does not address 
all the challenges identified by the National 
Research Council, but provides sufficient 
criteria for making a cursory evaluation of 
some current risk models. A 2006 survey 
identified thirty critical infrastructure models 
specializing in interdependency analysis.33 
A separate survey in 2012 identified twenty-
one critical infrastructure risk models for 
informing strategic decisions.34 Together, 
the two surveys identified forty-one distinct 
models. McGill’s Critical Asset and Portfolio 
Risk Analysis (CAPRA) was also added, 
making a total of forty-two models (See Table 
1). The limited information available was 
sufficient to examine only the twenty-two 
models identified in bold text in Table 1.  Of 
the twenty-two models examined, twelve 
used a threat-driven approach, seven were 
described as “complicated,” fourteen did not 
address “resiliency”, and two did not capture 
the broader impacts of a disaster. None of the 
models appeared to satisfy the NRC challenges. 
Table 1:  Critical Infrastructure Risk 
Assessment Models
1. AIMS 22. IIM
2. Athena 23. KM&V
3. BIRR 24. MDM
4. BMI 25. MIN
5. CAPRA 26. MUNICIPAL
6. CARVER2™ 27. N-ABLE
7. CIMS 28. NEMO
8. CIP 29. Net-Centric GIS
9. CIPDSS 30. NEXUS-FF
10. CIPMA 31. NGtools
11. CISIA 32. NSRAM
12. CommAspen 33. PFNAM
13. COUNTERACT 34. RAMCAP-Plus
14. DECRIS 35. RMCIS
15. DEW 36. RMF (DHS)
16. EMCAs 37. RVA
17. EURACOM 38. SRAM
18. FAIT 39. TRAGIS
19. FINSIM 40. TRANSIMS
20. Fort Future 41. UIS
21. IEISS 42. WISE
SHAPING AN ADEQUATE RISK 
FORMULATION
Obviously, an adequate risk formulation for 
guiding strategic decisions needs to overcome 
the previous challenges.  The foremost 
challenge is overcoming the inherent problems 
to the threat-driven approach. Adopting an 
asset-driven approach may do this. An asset-
driven approach estimates the consequences 
and probability of adversary success for an 
exhaustive set of plausible initiating events 
without regard to their probability of occurrence, 
and then overlays their likeliness of occurrence 
if such information is available.35 The main 
criticism of the asset-driven approach is that it 
is an “impact analysis” not a “risk analysis.”36 
Without a firm probability occurrence, the 
asset-driven approach is deemed less efficient 
at allocating resources where they’re most 
needed; i.e., the assets most likely to be attacked. 
Again, the dearth of attack data renders robust 
statistical analysis problematic. By comparison, 
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 10 Article 1 (February 2014) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
White,  Unified HS Strategy 5
natural hazards have amassed a great deal of 
data and been subject to extensive statistical 
analysis. Even with this advantage, forecasters 
still can’t predict with certitude where or when a 
natural disaster will strike. The primary benefit 
of statistical analysis to hazard prediction is 
in localizing their effects. Thus, for example, 
while earthquakes are a national phenomenon, 
California justifiably bears the cost of more 
stringent seismic standards compared to 
Connecticut. Localization can be similarly 
applied to critical infrastructure without 
the benefit of statistical analysis. Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 7 does this by 
specifying protection for critical infrastructure 
“whose exploitation or destruction by terrorists 
could cause catastrophic health effects or mass 
casualties comparable to the use of a weapon 
of mass destruction… [or] have a debilitating 
effect on security and economic well-being.”37 
Of the sixteen infrastructure sectors currently 
categorized by the federal government, the nine 
listed in Table 2 could be targeted to precipitate 
mass or debilitating effects.





5. Food & Agriculture
6. Information Networks
7. Nuclear Reactors, Materials, & Waste
8. Transportation Systems
9. Water & Wastewater Systems
Not included in the list in Table 2 are 
commercial facilities, communications, critical 
manufacturing, defense industrial base, 
emergency services, government facilities, 
and healthcare and public health. Commercial 
facilities include 460 skyscrapers, the loss 
of two of which proved particularly deadly 
on 9/11. But the collapse of the Twin Towers 
was due to subversion of the transportation 
sector turning passenger jets into guided 
missiles. The buildings themselves did not 
pose a catastrophic threat and had withstood 
a conventional bombing attack in 1993. The 
criticality of large buildings rests in their value 
as secondary targets where large numbers of 
people congregate. By themselves, they cannot 
precipitate mass effects. Similar arguments 
may be made for the remaining sectors.
Insofar as developing an adequate risk 
formulation is concerned, it is also important to 
choose the right metric. An appropriate metric 
must answer three questions:  (1) What is the 
risk to? (2) What is the risk from? and (3) How 
much risk is acceptable?38 To answer these 
questions, it is necessary to turn to earlier work 
in game theory.
Game theory is the study of multi-agent 
decision problems. Most of the current research 
and applications are conducted by micro-
economists, though game theory has also been 
successfully applied to areas as diverse as 
computer science and evolutionary biology.39 
Thus, it was not unexpected that game theory 
should yield valuable insights when it started 
to be applied to the problem of terrorism 
in the 1970s.40 In 1988, Todd Sandler and 
Harvey Lapan used game theory to examine 
the strategic relationship between terrorists’ 
choice of targets and the targets’ investment 
decisions. They discovered that an investment 
decision by one target had a direct impact on 
the vulnerability or likelihood of attack on the 
other. From this insight they concluded that 
(1) a coordinated defense policy among all 
targets is more efficient than an uncoordinated 
one, and (2) the optimum defense strategy is 
to protect all targets equally, not necessarily 
maximally. Sandler and Lapan’s findings were 
dependent on a particular value representing 
the terrorist’s probability of attack failure, 
which they designated as θ.41 Sandler and 
Lapan’s research suggest a metric based on θ 
as it answers the three questions:  (1) What is 
the risk to?  The risk is to critical infrastructure 
assets; (2) What is the risk from? The risk is from 
an attacker; (3) How much risk is acceptable? 
Targets are optimally protected when they are 
equally protected. 
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AN ASSET VULNERABILITY 
MODEL
An Asset Vulnerability Model is now 
introduced to work with the DHS Risk 
Management Framework and (1) convey 
current risk levels, (2) support cost-benefit 
analysis, (3) demonstrate risk reduction 
effects across multiple assets at different 
levels of management, and (4) measure and 
track investments and improvement in overall 
system resiliency over time. AVM analysis is 
predicated on a risk measure designated as Θ 
representing an attacker’s probability of failure 
based on the Sandler and Lapan value θ. The 
two values differ in that the Sandler and Lapan 
θ represents an attacker’s perception while 
the AVM Θ represents the defender’s known 
understanding. AVM is comprised of three 
elements: (1) baseline analysis, (2) cost-benefit 
analysis, and (3) decision support tools.
Baseline analysis produces a risk profile of all 
critical assets based on Θ. Theta is calculated in 
an asset-based risk formula addressing the five 
phases of emergency management. A separate 
Θ is calculated for every critical infrastructure 
asset as listed in Table 2 that may be exploited 
or destroyed to create mass or debilitating 





P(dis) = Probability an attack can be detected/disrupted
(1.1)
P(def) = Probability an attack can be defeated
(1.2)
P(den) = Probability a worst case disaster can be averted
(1.3)
P(dim) = Probability 100% of the survivors can be saved
(1.4)
%(dam) = % decrease in economic output * % increase in 
mortality rate
(1.5)
P(dis) corresponds to the “prevent” phase 
of emergency management and is calculated 
from known intelligence data by dividing the 
number of thwarted attacks by the number of 
planned and executed attacks. This estimation 
for stopping an attack is fundamentally 
different from trying to predict the start of 
one, making acceptable use of what limited 
historical data available. P(def) corresponds to 
the “protect” phase of emergency management. 
P(def) is derived from the Protective Measure 
Index (PMI) assessed by security surveys and 
vulnerability assessments currently conducted 
by DHS. PMI are assessed at Argonne National 
Laboratory from data collected by a cadre of DHS 
Protective Security Advisors, helping maintain 
consistency of results.42 P(den) corresponds 
to the “mitigate” phase of emergency 
management and examines failure modes and 
redundancy designed to prevent an asset’s 
incapacitation or subversion. As part of its PMI 
calculation, Argonne National Laboratory also 
produces a Resiliency Index that may be used 
in this estimation.43 P(dim) corresponds to the 
“response” phase of emergency management. 
P(dim) is calculated based on the capacity of 
first responders to rescue and treat survivors 
within seventy-two-hours of a catastrophe. A 
default value may be calculated from historical 
data for similar size incidents independent of 
cause. The %(dam) parameter simultaneously 
represents the “recovery” phase of emergency 
management and the magnitude component 
of the risk assessment formula. It taps existing 
national economic and mortality data capturing 
the broader impacts for incidents of both mass 
destruction and disruption.
Cost-benefit analysis finds the optimum 
combination of security improvement 
measures proposed for each asset. Cost-benefit 
analysis is conducted using ΔΘ and D(ΔΘ) 
for each improvement measure. Delta theta is 
the estimated increase in Θ for the proposed 
improvement measure. Delta theta is provided 
in component form as P(Δdis), P(Δdef), 
P(Δden), and P(Δdim).  The magnitude 
component, %(dam) remains unchanged as it 
represents the worst-case disaster if an asset is 
compromised. An associated cost component is 
provided for each ΔΘ in the form of D(Δdis), 
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D(Δdef), D(Δden), and D(Δdim). Each proposed 
improvement measure has an associated set of 
paired ΔΘ and D(ΔΘ) data tuples. P(Δdef) and 
P(Δden) are directly related to assets, whereas 
P(Δdis) and P(Δdim) represent national and 
regional improvement measures that are 
proportionally assigned to affected assets. 
The given ΔΘ and D(ΔΘ) values are discrete, 
representing specific capabilities for purchase. 
The choice of whether or not to buy them is also 
discrete; there are no fractional solutions. The 
data sets associated with each improvement are 
also independent. This stipulation eliminates 
dependency analysis. Estimating ΔΘ will be 
difficult enough using either expert elicitation 
or computer modeling. Consistency will be key, 
suggesting that ΔΘ should be estimated by a 
central source, perhaps at Argonne National 
Laboratory using techniques already developed 
for the Protective Measure Index and Resilience 
Index. Cost-benefit analysis calculates the 
combined ΔΘ and D(ΔΘ) for each asset 
according to the formulations shown in 2.0 
and 3.0. A proportional value is then derived 
by dividing ΔΘ by D(ΔΘ). The cost-benefit 
analysis program selects the combination of 
measures producing the highest proportional 
value for the given asset.
ΔΘ = P(Δdis)*P(Δdef)*P(Δden)*P(Δdim)*%(dam)
(2.0) 
D(ΔΘ) =  D(Δdis)+D(Δdef)+D(Δden)+D(Δdim)
(3.0)
Decision support tools graphically portray 
the results of baseline and cost-benefit analyses 
and facilitate various views to present the 
information in a manner most meaningful 
to a decision maker. Figure 1.1 portrays the 
unfiltered results from baseline analysis using 
simulated data. Real data was unavailable as it 
is protected under the 2002 Homeland Security 
Act from disclosure even under the Freedom of 
Information Act. Alternative views of the data 
may be selected. For example, Figure 1.2 shows 
the baseline data sorted by Θ, identifying the most 
protected to the least protected assets. Figure 
1.3 sorts baseline data by asset type, depicting 
the relative protection of assets within the same 
sector. Figure 1.4 indicates relative protection 
of assets within a given geographic region. 
Other views may also be generated as desired. 
Similarly, the results from cost-benefit analysis 
can be graphically portrayed to assist decision 
makers with allocating resources. For example, 
Figure 2.1 shows assets ordered by largest to 
smallest improvement gains, facilitating the 
purchase of the highest protection within a 
fixed budget. Figure 2.2 shows assets ordered 
by improvement cost, facilitating the purchase 
of the most protection measures within a 
fixed budget. If the decision maker wishes to 
concentrate on protecting a particular sector, 
then improvements can be sorted by asset type 
as in Figure 2.3. If the decision maker wishes to 
concentrate on protecting a particular region, 
then improvements can be sorted by asset 
location as in Figure 2.4. The significance of 
these tools is that they provide a snapshot of 
the current homeland security profile and can 
inform resource allocation decisions based on 
any number of different investment strategies.
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Figure 1.1:  Unfiltered AVM Baseline Analysis 
Depicting Current Homeland Security Risk 
Profile
Figure 1.2:  Baseline AVM Data Sorted by 
Theta Identifying Assets from Least to Most 
Vulnerable
Figure 1.3:  Baseline AVM Data Sorted by 
Asset Type Identifying Vulnerabilities by 
Infrastructure Sector
Figure 1.4:  Baseline AVM Data Sorted by 
Asset Location Identifying Vulnerabilities by 
Region
Figure 2.1:  AVM Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Identifying Improvements in Order of Benefit 
(largest to smallest)
Figure 2.2:  AVM Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Identifying Improvements by Cost (smallest to 
largest)
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Figure 2.3:  AVM Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Identifying Improvements by Asset Type
Figure 2.4:  AVM Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Identifying Improvements by Region
AVM addresses many of the challenges 
to developing an adequate risk formulation 
for critical infrastructure. AVM avoids 
the problem of reliable threat estimation 
by adopting an asset-based vulnerability 
approach to risk management. Yet AVM is a 
comprehensive formulation addressing the five 
phases of emergency management: prevent, 
protect, mitigate, respond, and recover.  All 
probability components in the AVM risk 
formulation, P(dis), P(def), P(den), and 
P(dim) make use of available empirical data 
facilitating documentation, transparency, and 
repeatability. The consequence component, 
%(dam), incorporates national economic and 
health data that capture the broader effects 
of both disruptive and destructive attacks. 
And AVM provides cost-benefit analysis and 
graphical presentation of the results in multiple 
formats supporting flexible decision strategies 
at all levels of management.  
Working within the Risk Management 
Framework, AVM provides direction and 
coordination to help overcome current 
operational shortfalls. Beginning with Step Two 
of the framework, “Identify Infrastructure,” 
AVM can help differentiate what infrastructure 
is critical from what is not. For example, 
shopping malls, race tracks, theme parks, and 
other questionable assets currently tracked 
by DHS would not be evaluated under AVM 
as they are inert, and by themselves could not 
be subverted or employed to create mass or 
debilitating effects. AVM baseline analysis 
conducted in Step Three, “Assess an Analyze 
Risks,” provides a current risk profile of critical 
assets using the same capabilities and processes 
currently employed at DHS. By addressing 
risk components both “inside” and “outside” 
the perimeter of critical infrastructure, AVM 
provides a coordinating mechanism between 
the Risk Management Framework and National 
Preparedness System. Of course, there remains 
the question of voluntary versus mandatory data 
collection on the part of private industry. Most 
sectors identified in Table 2 are already federally 
regulated. It would not require much regulatory 
change to institute mandatory data collection 
from these sectors.44 AVM cost-benefit analysis 
evaluates proposed improvement measures and 
identifies those providing the largest protective 
gain for the least cost. Thus AVM compares 
protective measures across all five phases of 
emergency management to determine the best 
investment option. AVM decision support 
tools present results in a flexible format that 
assists decision makers in recommending and 
justifying resource allocations in Step Four, 
“Implement Risk Management Activities.” 
Through iterative application within the Risk 
Management Framework, AVM can measure 
and track investments and improvements over 
time.
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POLICY EXTENSION
As has been demonstrated, AVM can help 
unify and guide strategic investment decisions 
for protecting critical infrastructure. Critical 
infrastructure, though, is only half the 
problem. Weapons of mass destruction in the 
form of chemical, biological, radiological, and 
nuclear agents also present the opportunity 
for asymmetric attack. Referring back to 
Sandler and Lapan’s findings in game theory 
(a coordinated defense is more efficient than 
an uncoordinated one) suggests that AVM 
should be extended to encompass both critical 
infrastructure and CBRN stockpiles. This will 
require interagency coordination between 
DHS, the Department of Defense, and the 
Department of Energy. Strategy coordination 
between executive departments is conducted 
at the highest level in the National Security 
Council.45 Strategy formulation is shaped 
by National Security Strategy (NSS), which 
serves as a coordinating framework for federal 
agencies to prioritize resources and schedule 
activities to work towards common national 
goals.46 
Current National Security Strategy 
reiterates the definition of homeland security 
promulgated in the 2010 Quadrennial 
Homeland Security Review as “a concerted 
national effort to ensure a homeland that is 
safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism 
and other and other hazards where American 
interests, aspirations, and way of life can 
thrive.”47 This definition places terrorism at the 
forefront of homeland security concerns. Such 
a suggestion belies the historical significance of 
9/11. The United States had suffered terrorist 
attacks long before 9/11, but it wasn’t until 
those attacks that homeland security became a 
national priority.  What was unique about 9/11 
that prompted the largest re-organization of 
US government since World War II and made 
homeland security part of the national lexicon? 
According to the 9/11 Commission, it was the 
“surpassing disproportion” of the attack. On 
September 11, 2001, nineteen men inflicted 
as much damage on the United States as the 
Imperial Japanese Navy on December 7, 1941.48 
9/11 made manifest the unprecedented threat 
of domestic catastrophic attack accomplished 
through asymmetric means by small groups 
or individuals acting on their own behalf. The 
problem is not terrorism. Terrorism is defined 
as “any premeditated, unlawful act dangerous 
to human life or public welfare that is intended 
to intimidate or coerce civilian populations 
or governments.”49 Terrorism is a motive. 
Certainly it played a role in the 9/11 attacks, 
but who is to say it is the only motive that could 
precipitate another such attack?  
The current preoccupation with terrorism 
distracts attention from the real threat 
discerned by the 9/11 Commission: domestic 
catastrophic attack precipitated by subverting 
critical infrastructure or employing weapons 
of mass destruction. To effectively coordinate 
interagency efforts towards this problem, a 
new definition of homeland security should 
be considered. An alternative definition 
might be “to safeguard the United States from 
domestic catastrophic attack.” This definition 
is more precise because it focuses on the 
specific problem of domestic catastrophic 
attack, directing attention to those means 
that make it possible. This definition is more 
comprehensive because it doesn’t restrict the 
motives of the attackers. This definition is 
more discriminate because it distinguishes 
catastrophic attack from other forms of crime 
such as the mass killings at Newtown, Virginia 
Tech, and Columbine. Supported by AVM, 
the corresponding homeland security strategy 
becomes “maximize protective investments that 
minimize the probability of successful domestic 
catastrophic attack.” This statement offers a 
concise strategy specifying “ends,” “ways,” and 
“means.” Together with the new definition, 
they can help direct interagency efforts towards 
a unified homeland security strategy.
FUTURE RESEARCH
While this paper has endeavored to present a 
comprehensive framework for defining and 
improving homeland security, some important 
implementation details remain for future 
research, and additional areas need to be 
explored.
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First, a definitive taxonomy must be 
developed to help identify those things that 
can create a domestic catastrophic attack. 
DHS previously developed taxonomy for its 
National Asset Database.50 Perhaps it can be 
adopted for this application. CARVER+Shock 
analysis has also been employed and may be 
sufficiently useful.51 Related to this effort is 
defining “catastrophic attack.” In 2002, the 
term “macroterrorism” was coined as “an act 
of terrorism causing at least 500 deaths, and/
or property damage or economic loss exceeding 
$1 billion.”52 For reasons stated earlier, the 
word “terrorism” should be avoided as part 
of any definition of “catastrophic attack.” As 
concern for homeland security began with 9/11, 
maybe it should become the benchmark: “Any 
deliberate act inflicting over 3,000 deaths or 
$40 billion in damages.” This remains an area 
to be explored.
Understandably, the National Research 
Council places a premium on verifying 
and validating model results.53 Again, the 
availability of historical data is problematic. 
In this regard, the NRC suggests one possible 
method recommended by the JASON scientific 
advisor group to “address smaller, well-defined, 
testable pieces of the larger problem.”54 How 
this might be accomplished is also an area for 
research.
A glaring omission from this proposal is how 
to treat natural disasters? Disaster response 
became a homeland security mission when 
FEMA was folded into DHS. The prevailing 
logic was that many of the same response 
and recovery capabilities for natural disasters 
were applicable to manmade catastrophes.55 
This rationale is supported by early work 
done at the Disaster Research Center (DRC) 
examining the demands a crisis imposes upon 
a social system and concluded that different 
agents may precipitate similar responses.56 
However, accounting for disasters in the same 
risk formulas for catastrophic attack presents a 
challenge in skewing the results because they 
have comparatively higher rates of probability 
and predictability. The problem is how to 
incorporate natural disasters into the analysis 
so they don’t distract from the root problem 
of catastrophic attack. The National Research 
Council recommends keeping them separate.57
Finally, while AVM provides the means for 
developing coherent strategy, the next logical 
step is to explore among the alternatives. 
What investment strategy affords the greatest 
protection? Should DHS allocate funds 
towards (1) protective improvement measures 
based on least cost, (2) assets that are least 
protected, (3) regional improvements, (4) 
sector improvements, (5) improvements that 
provide the greatest protective gain, (6) assets 
with the highest consequences, or (7) some 
other strategy? Research has just begun to 
examine these strategies using AVM, and the 
preliminary results look interesting. 
CONCLUSION
This paper has examined current problems and 
underlying challenges to developing strategic 
direction for protecting critical infrastructure. 
It introduced an Asset Vulnerability Model 
to overcome these challenges and provide a 
coordinating framework facilitating strategic 
direction. Then, informed by insights from game 
theory, it proposed a policy framework that 
would extend AVM protection to encompass 
both critical infrastructure and domestic CBRN 
stockpiles. In this manner, AVM can account 
for investment of scarce national resources and 
lead the nation towards a unified homeland 
security strategy.
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ABSTRACT
The most important purpose of Presidential 
Policy Directive (PPD-8) on national 
preparedness is to establish a foundation that 
can be adapted to and utilized by stakeholders 
of all kinds and at all public and private 
levels. PPD-8 appeared somewhat abruptly 
on the scene, essentially replacing Homeland 
Security Policy Directive (HSPD-8), which had 
accomplished much but suffered setbacks and 
stalled in its effectiveness. Perhaps the single 
most important step the Obama Administration 
can take at this point is to make as clear as 
possible to the nation not only about the need 
for, but also the challenges encountered in 
implementing a national preparedness plan. 
Efforts need to be redoubled if serious and 
sustained progress is to be made by the end 
of the President’s second term.  On balance, 
given that the fundamental elements of 
PPD-8 are similar to HSPD-8 but even more 
complex, the author’s view is that the newer 
initiative faces the reality of ultimately being 
overwhelmed by powerful analytic difficulties 
and/or governance-related impediments – 
falling short of its goals, which may simply be 
too ambitious to realize. 
DISCUSSION
On March 30, 2011, President Obama issued 
Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-8), a 
sweeping statement on national preparedness.1 
Its objective is “aimed at strengthening the 
security and resilience of the United States 
through systematic preparation for the threats 
that pose the greatest risk to the security 
of the Nation, including acts of terrorism, 
cyber attacks, pandemics, and catastrophic 
natural disasters.”2 One of the more important 
purposes of PPD-8 is to establish a national-
level foundation that can be adapted to and 
utilized by stakeholders at the state and local 
level.3 
This punchy, six page Directive set in motion 
a complex set of supporting policies, programs, 
and procedures affecting the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) as well as all federal 
agencies with homeland security responsibilities. 
Critical components of this directive include 
developing a National Preparedness Goal (the 
Goal) that identifies core capabilities necessary 
for preparedness; employing a risk-informed 
capabilities planning method for prioritizing 
stakeholder capabilities; establishing a 
National Preparedness System (NPS) to guide 
planning and implementation activities needed 
to achieve the Goal; and producing a series of 
annual National Preparedness Reports (NPR) 
to assess progress.
As readers familiar with homeland security 
policies can attest, PPD-8 appeared somewhat 
abruptly on the scene, replacing Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive (HSPD-8) 
signed by President George W. Bush in late 
2003.4 No reasons were given in the Directive 
or accompanying public statements for why 
it was decided to replace HSPD-8, nor were 
references made in PPD-8 to the existence of 
such an earlier, similar directive.5 It is difficult 
to avoid concluding that political forces as well 
as substantive needs were at work in driving 
PPD-8, designed to give President Obama 
full credit for moving forward on national 
preparedness, without explicit recognition of 
work done under the previous Administration.6 
During the few years the new Directive has 
been in existence, the nation has experienced 
a series of devastating natural disasters and 
accidents, as well as the terrorist attack at the 
Boston Marathon.7  National preparedness has 
once again become a prominent public policy 
issue.
The purpose of this article is to explore the 
question of how well PPD-8 might meet its 
goals and objectives by the time the Obama 
Administration’s second term is completed. 
It offers an understanding of the important 
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similarities and differences between PPD-8 and 
the earlier HSPD-8.8 Referring to the article’s 
odd subtitle, our investigation can be framed 
as whither PPD-8 (i.e., where is it bound?) or 
wither PPD-8 (i.e., will it fade away?). 
CORE CAPABILITIES FOR 
PREPAREDNESS
Preparedness in the PPD-8 context is taken to 
mean building the core capabilities “necessary 
to prepare for the specific types of incidents 
that pose the greatest risk to the security of the 
Nation [… and a set of] prioritized objectives to 
mitigate that risk.”9 Using a capability-based 
planning process, the Goal identifies thirty-one 
different core capabilities aimed at turning each 
of five mission areas – prevent, protect mitigate, 
respond, recover – into practical policies and 
programs expressed as a set of prioritized 
objectives to reduce that risk.10 The Goal also 
offers preliminary targets for each capability 
– so-called capability targets (TC) – that serve 
as a basis for assessing effective preparedness 
capabilities and identifying capability gaps. 
Many questions have arisen about the way 
core capabilities are addressed under PPD-8.11 
National level core capabilities need to be based 
on credible evidence and/or systematic use of 
expert opinion, quantitatively or heuristically 
measurable, and tailorable to different users 
and situations. Without having been on the 
inside and in the absence of open sources that 
tell the full story, it is unclear how the PPD-8 
national core capabilities were constructed and 
how performance targets for each capability 
were developed.12 
Speaking to a spectrum of stakeholders, 
the Goal stresses individual and community 
preparedness as fundamental to success, 
together with preparedness of governments 
at all levels and the private sector, 
including businesses and N0n-Govermental 
Organizations (NGO).13 Each member of the 
“whole community” is expected to achieve 
effective preparedness levels.14
A laudable goal of PPD-8 is to establish 
measurable targets for core capabilities, scaled 
for diverse stakeholders. However, this is no 
easy task. As we will see, it is difficult enough 
to create a set of national preparedness core 
capabilities and with measurable targets, but 
far more challenging to adapt and apply these 
to the needs of all specific members of the 
whole community. Perhaps this helps explain 
why the PPD-8 implementation effort has 
faced difficulties in providing an analytically 
justified set of capabilities and targets that can 
support application across the diverse set of 
stakeholders and circumstances.15  
PREPAREDNESS RISK 
ASSESSMENTS
A strategic, national-level risk assessment 
(SNRA) was conducted as a necessary step 
soon after PPD-8 was issued.16 Results of 
the SNRA were used to formulate PPD-
8 national core capabilities and associated 
target priorities. The more important goal of 
the SNRA, however, was to provide the basis 
for developing a risk assessment method 
that could ultimately be used for the regions, 
communities, and multitude of local entities 
that comprise the nation, enabling them to 
prioritize their capability needs and gaps. 
Notwithstanding this expected follow-up role 
for the SNRA, a different path was followed to 
assist stakeholders below the national level in 
conducting risk assessments for preparedness.17 
THIRA Arrives
In April 2012, FEMA issued a Threat and 
Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 
(THIRA) Guide.18 Unlike the national-level 
thrust of the SNRA, the THIRA Guide is about 
community preparedness, a subject that has 
received great attention in recent years.19 While 
the focus is on communities broadly defined, 
the Guide claims its approach can be adapted 
for use by all relevant entities below the federal 
level to support a diverse array of stakeholders 
– from all kinds of businesses, to owners and 
operators of large power faculties, to sprawling 
urban areas.20
The THIRA Guide itself notes the challenges 
in applying risk methodologies designed to 
deal with such a complex set of users as found 
in the range of communities across the nation, 
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each of which faces an array of relevant threats 
and hazards – sometimes in common but 
more often than not specific to its location, 
exposure, and other unique factors. Looked at 
from the opposite perspective, PPD-8 calls for 
communities, as well as other entities, to each 
contribute to the Goal by preparing for risks 
that are most urgent and important from their 
perspective by employing core capabilities that 
can strengthen their resilience.
Risk Assessment Process 
A five-step process is presented in the THIRA 
Guide covering such issues as identifying likely 
threats and hazards, characterizing these 
challenges, conducting risk assessments, 
developing core capabilities and targets, 
and establishing preparedness measures to 
mitigate risk.21 Execution of each of these 
steps is far from simple. Special expertise is 
needed to develop the needed methodological 
techniques for these risk assessments – 
estimating threats, developing scenarios, 
calculating consequences, producing capability 
needs, developing performance targets, and 
measuring mitigating effects. Not all required 
expertise might be available in each situation.22 
With SNRA applied nationally and to 
federal agencies and THIRA available for 
all stakeholders below the federal level, 
PPD-8 holds out great expectations for risk 
assessments as a tool to   develop and prioritize 
core capabilities across the five mission areas. 
The idea is to use such tools for integrating 
contributions toward achieving the Goal from 
all stakeholders of different types and levels. 
This means not only combining risk results 
horizontally at the state level across the nation, 
but also aggregating these results vertically up 
the chain in order to characterize how well the 
system meets the broad national objectives 
presented in the Goal. As further explored 
below, this process faces such a high degree 
of significant challenges that it might prove to 
be impossible to execute in practice – a key 
issue the Guide does not address in a serious 
manner.23
In sum, the THIRA Guide is an informative 
document about risk in connection with 
preparedness planning for homeland security. 
However, it has an upbeat style that does not 
pay enough attention to how risk assessments 
in connection with PPD-8 are extremely 
difficult to develop and execute with meaningful 
results integrated across the diverse range of 
stakeholders, missions, and scenarios. The 
conundrum is how to find an accurate way to 
conduct preparedness risk assessments that 
can be executed by key groups of stakeholders, 
notably typical communities. 
NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS 
SYSTEM
The PPD-8 Implementation Plan calls for the 
secretary of Homeland Security to develop 
a National Preparedness System (NPS) in 
coordination with other executive departments 
and agencies, and in consultation with state, 
local, tribal, and territorial governments, the 
private and nonprofit sectors, and the public. 
Published in late 2011 as an official FEMA 
document, the NPS is a means of outlining 
the process for h0w all stakeholders can move 
forward with their preparedness activities. 
This system is composed of six interlinked 
components: (1) identifying and assessing risk; 
(2) estimating the level of capabilities needed to 
address those risks; (3) building or sustaining 
the required levels of capability; (4) developing 
and implementing plans to deliver those 
capabilities; (5) validating and monitoring 
progress; and (6) reviewing and updating 
efforts to promote continuous improvement.24
Nature of the NPS
Given such a broad scope and significant 
statement of purposes, the NPS is a surprisingly 
short, readable, somewhat informal publication, 
apparently aimed at interested citizens needing 
an overview of the process, rather than 
audiences of large institutions or homeland 
security professionals where a more thorough 
presentation would be suitable.25 This might be 
due to an attempt to target the lowest common 
denominator of the diverse NPS audience.. 
In April 2013, FEMA published a new 
document focused on estimating capability 
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needs and gaps, known as the Capability 
Estimation Comprehensive Planning Guide 
(CPG) 201.26 This document is said to support 
the second NPS component and replace THIRA 
in supporting the first component by enhancing 
but going beyond presenting a risk method per 
se and demonstrating the process by which 
communities could apply a risk assessment 
to determine resources needed to deliver core 
capabilities to the target levels.27 
CPG 201 describes in detail a method that 
leads to core capabilities for mitigating risk. 
The THIRA Guide, as noted earlier, needs 
more detail in explaining a risk assessment 
method if this is to be an operational rather 
than educational product.  Unfortunately, the 
processes found in  CPG 201 suffer from the 
opposite problem of being too complex for 
real world application by communities, even 
with experts involved.28  Balance is essential to 
ensure that stakeholders at all levels understand 
and apply risk assessments that result in 
countermeasures and mitigation strategies.
The third and fourth NPS components are 
fleshed out in a set of five National Planning 
Frameworks – one for each mission area 
– billed as instrumental to the success of 
PPD-8 implementation in helping ensure 
the whole community can work together to 
achieve national preparedness.29 Frameworks 
for almost all of the five PPD-8 mission 
areas have been released.30 Each Planning 
Framework is relatively comprehensive – 
defining relevant mission areas, summarizing 
the roles and responsibilities of members of 
the whole committee, and identifying relevant 
information to help with operational planning 
in delivering core capabilities to communities. 
The status of the two final components remains 
unclear.
Status of the NPS
Much is riding on how the goals and objectives 
of PPD-8 at the local level are turned into the 
reality of meaningful policies and cost-effective 
programs all based on serious planning efforts. 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
concluded, “FEMA has made progress addressing 
that agency’s earlier recommendation to 
develop a national preparedness assessment 
with clear, objective, and quantifiable capability 
requirements and performance measures, but 
continues to face challenges in developing a 
national preparedness system that could assist 
the agency in prioritizing preparedness grant 
funding.”31 In giving FEMA credit for making 
progress in managing PPD-8 implementation, 
the GAO mentions publication of the THIRA 
Guide in 2012 and   issuance of the first 
National Preparedness Report (NPR), which 
will be discussed below.32 
There remains work to be done, for example, 
in finalizing the full set of Frameworks to include 
validating and monitoring progress. Also 
needed are steps for reviewing all capabilities, 
resources, and plans based on updated risk 
assessments, and showing how the various 
components interact dynamically.33 From an 
overall perspective, what needs to be secured 
and sustained is a strategy to build the proper 
capabilities for each group of stakeholders that 
are affordable and support the five preparedness 
missions. There is also a critical need, as will be 
further discussed, to develop a credible method 
for integrating and aggregating preparedness 
levels achieved by stakeholders that result in a 
national level preparedness assessment.
NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS 
REPORT
PPD-8 requires annual National Preparedness 
Reports (NPR) be submitted by the secretary 
of Homeland Security to the president. As 
officially expressed, “[L]ooking across all…core 
capabilities outlined in the Goal, NPRs provide 
a national perspective on critical preparedness 
trends for whole community partners to use to 
inform program priorities, allocate resources, 
and communicate with stakeholders about 
issues of shared concern.”34 The first in this 
series of NPR was issued in March 2012 and the 
second a year later.35  
Understanding the NPR
The 2013 NPR focuses on homeland security 
programs and policies completed or underway 
as reported for 2o12. It is an extremely 
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comprehensive document filled with detailed 
charts, graphs, and other forms of data 
presentation, as well as case studies, to support 
a series of eight overarching national trends 
and sixty-two key findings that align to the 
thirty-one core capabilities across the five PPD-
8 missions.36
The foundation for this analytic structure 
is the local assessments within each state 
and territory, which take the form of State 
Preparedness Reports (SPR).37 These contain 
state-level ratings of each core capability as 
high, medium, or low priority, based on results 
of THIRA risk assessments and capability 
estimates derived by aggregating results on risk-
informed inputs from the Sub-State Regions 
(SSR) into which each of the fifty-six states and 
territories are supposed to be divided.38 The 
SSR provide locally based assessments and data 
to the fifty-six states and territories that form 
draft SPR for FEMA to review. Once finalized, 
these are synthesized by FEMA to produce 
ten regional risk/capability assessments, 
which then lead to the national preparedness 
assessment captured in the NPR.39
The 2013 NPR findings incorporate 
preparedness information for each core 
capability from the 2012 SPR process, which 
serves as a baseline for assessing progress 
made in implementing preparedness efforts in 
support of PPD-8 capability targets. There is no 
room in this article to cover the many details 
covered in the 2013 NPR. Worth highlighting, 
however, are the document’s discussions of the 
following items.
• Progress made for core capabilities that 
support all five mission areas, notably 
Planning, Operational Coordination, 
Intelligence and Information Sharing, and 
Operational Communication.      
• Accomplishments in other core capabilities 
with broadly relevant capabilities identified 
– notably, cybersecurity, recovery-focused 
core capabilities, and integration of 
individuals with disabilities and access and 
functional needs.  
• Newly identified national areas for 
improvement under PPD-8, which have 
been part of preparedness initiatives 
for many years, including resilience of 
infrastructure systems and maturing the 
role of public-private partnerships. 
With these sorts of outputs, the 2013 NPR 
represents a snapshot in time showing progress, 
current status, and issues to be tackled on the 
road to national preparedness. 
Value of the NPR
The first two NPR represent a pattern of 
slowly assembling the many pieces of national 
preparedness policies and programs at the 
stakeholder level as a means of providing a 
national perspective. The first NPR affirms the 
longer-term vision of this series of publications 
– notably, establishing “a routine, repeatable 
process that builds on other preparedness 
efforts, engages whole community partners, 
and provides meaningful, consistent input 
to show progress annually.”40 Constructing 
a truly representative, supported, and useful 
picture of something as complex as the national 
preparedness of the nation to meet a wide 
range of threats and hazards across the country 
at all levels of stakeholders will take time to 
demonstrate and develop for operational use in 
forming policies and priorities.41 
The overall methodology employed to 
gather and assess data to generate what 
the NPR calls a national level assessment is 
complex and questionable. The first two NPR 
are filled with facts, figures, anecdotes, and 
observations, but do not represent credible, 
objective, supportable analysis. Using the SSR 
inputs, for example, both NPR rank order 
the percentage of states and territories rating 
themselves as high on a five-point assessment 
scale for planning, organization, equipment, 
training, and exercises. Here, as in other parts 
of the overall PPD-8 process, we face the issue 
of false precision, where results might look 
good but be misleading by not accounting for 
the  many uncertainties inherent in complex 
system behaviors. As preparedness efforts 
evolve and mature, there is recognition that 
‘”future iterations of the NPR will increasingly 
reflect quantitative performance data and 
assessment results, as well as qualitative 
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program accomplishments that align with the 
Goal.” 42
However, at the end of the day, the path 
chosen by the NPR for fulfilling the need for 
a national preparedness assessment is likely 
to fail. Results based on non-validated data 
gathered at local levels within states will almost 
surely remain questionable, given the pilot 
program’s results and more recent observations. 
Not to be forgotten is that SPR – instrumental 
inputs for the NPR – are built upon obtaining 
complete and credible assessments from the 
ground up for integration and aggregation. 
While lessons have been learned from earlier 
testing under a series of DHS-organized Pilot 
Capabilities Assessments (PCA), obtaining 
comprehensive and accurate sub-state and 
local preparedness inputs may not be feasible 
and, as self-assessments are used at this level, 
may not be credible.43 
One final methodological concern is that 
the NPR are based upon self-assessments by 
the states. Even if relying upon what seems 
to be comprehensive and consistent data – an 
assumption that cannot be taken for granted 
– such self-assessments raise serious concerns 
over objectivity and credibility in Congress and 
with the stakeholder community and the public 
at large. Shifting to an independent assessment 
might be a wise step to take. 
TWO BIG ISSUES
The GAO’s conclusion that progress has 
been made towards reaching PPD-8’s goals 
and objectives are correct as far as they go.44 
However, with its public face and in open 
testimonies as well as published documents, 
the Administration has yet to directly confront 
and discuss in some detail the inescapable fact 
that this program continues to face enormous 
challenges. Quite the opposite, PPD-8 and its 
key implementing documents tend to present 
preparedness plans and actions as relatively 
easy to execute by any member of the whole 
community — from individuals to large 
organizations. 
This approach is misleading. The public 
should be made aware at least of the two 
largest hurdles to overcome before national 
preparedness can in fact be achieved: the 
difficulties in understanding the level of 
preparedness and the dilemmas faced in 
dealing with governance issues.
Wicked Problem 
When turning from words to implementation, 
the PPD-8 approach to national preparedness 
reflects the characteristics of what is called a 
“wicked problem” – hard to define, delimit, 
and understand, reflecting uncertainties, and 
having many moving parts that interact often 
in unknown ways.45 The sheer complexity 
of the multifaceted PPD-8 implementation 
strategy has already been demonstrated in our 
discussions of such elements of the Directive as 
capabilities-based planning, risk assessments, 
and the National Planning Frameworks. For 
this reason, practical assessment of national 
preparedness will involve a multivariable, 
multi-dimensional process of measuring, 
assessing, and aggregating the performance of 
many different capabilities deployed by many 
different entities at many different stakeholder 
levels to address five different mission areas. 
Such wicked problems are typically not prone to 
analytic solutions leading to useable outcomes. 
One aspect of wickedness in PPD-8 has to 
do with the extremely difficult analytic task of 
developing a set of measurable preparedness 
national capabilities that can be adapted to the 
needs of state and local stakeholders across the 
whole community with different threats and 
hazards and capabilities. Is it really expected that 
each of the ten FEMA national regions as well 
as the fifty-six states and territories, hundreds 
of metropolitan areas, thousands of cities, and 
tens of thousands of communities will have the 
interest, capabilities, and resources to produce 
such a plan?  How can these pieces be integrated 
into a coherent nationwide puzzle that portrays 
a credible picture of preparedness? What about 
incorporating cooperation with international 
partners, especially Canada and Mexico? 
As put by the GAO, “until FEMA develops 
clear, objective, and quantifiable capability 
requirements and performance measures, it is 
unclear what capability gaps currently exist and 
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what level of federal resources will be needed to 
close such gaps.”46
More fundamentally, multi-level nationwide 
preparedness capability assessments, such 
as represented by the PPD-8 initiative, 
pose complex analytic and organizational 
challenges. While there are existing methods 
for hierarchical data assessments – including 
the concept of multi-stage sampling and 
selective indicators – these approaches have 
their own limitations, do not deal directly with 
homeland security preparedness, and cannot 
easily be adapted to the problem PPD-8 seeks 
to address. A 2007 report by the Homeland 
Security and Analysis Institute provides a 
useful initial “proof of concept” examination 
of a layered homeland security preparedness 
approach. It “presents a method for developing 
preparedness capability assessments that 
integrate and aggregate assessments across all 
levels of responsibility, ultimately resulting in 
a nationwide assessment.”47 It demonstrates 
just how complex and virtually undoable such 
problems become when examined closely.
Preparedness can be said to have one reality 
at the federal level, another at the regional, 
another at the state, and still another at the local 
level. For example, the risks seen by a medium-
sized Midwestern community would be very 
different from those seen by coastal urban 
areas that are different still in regions such as 
the Pacific Northwest. The challenge faced is 
how to form a top-level aggregated assessment 
across all levels of government and non-
governmental entities, aimed at providing the 
president and Congress with an overall rating 
of how well the nation as a whole is prepared 
to meet major terrorist and natural disaster 
challenges. This is what the NPR ultimately 
aims to develop. It is not clear that there are 
other fundamentally different ways of trying to 
gauge national preparedness.48
Regrettably, as noted above, the PPD-8 
implementing documents do not clearly address 
the wickedness of the challenges faced. We 
find some instances where this issue is noted; 
for example, THIRA’s acknowledgement that 
risk assessments can be complicated.  We also 
find a few broad statements made in passing 
within which lurk extremely complex analytic 
challenges that are not mentioned, such as, “[t]
he five mission areas exist along a continuum, 
and there is a dynamic interplay between and 
among them and even some commonality” 
[emphasis added].49  However, the set of PPD-
8 documents as a whole do not do justice to 
the many analytic obstacles that need to be 
overcome in key assessment steps that need to 
be taken.
As a final point, HSPD-8 has also been 
characterized also as a wicked problem – 
though with more moving parts, PPD-8 may 
well be a more wicked problem to solve than 
HSPD-8.50
The Governance Dilemma 
PPD-8 implementation has been trying to 
engage all members of the whole community in 
a sustained manner, as preparedness requires 
constant attention as threats, circumstances, 
and requirements change. Without question, 
jurisdictions, agencies, and organizations at 
all levels would benefit from a standardized 
but flexible method to plan for, assess, and 
track preparedness within a common analytic 
framework. 
Given our federalist system, however, 
governance issues tend to arise when 
interactions take place among responsible 
authorities at all levels in developing capability 
assessments. States and local jurisdictions often 
resist what they perceive as federal imposition 
of a one-size-fits-all set of homeland security 
objectives, standards, and procedures. Early 
in the process of HSPD-8 implementation, for 
example, a senior DHS official observed that 
it would require a “’consensual community’ to 
accept and apply this approach, recognizing 
that endorsement of this process across all 
jurisdictions would be complicated and entail, 
inter alia, concerns over loss of sovereignty in 
some states.”51
Difficult as it may be, PPD-8 implementation, 
as HSPD-8 before it, must somehow seek to 
balance the federal government’s responsibility 
for the nation’s safety against the freedom 
for state and local jurisdictions to govern at 
their respective levels. There is no simple 
solution. Some argue that a top-down approach 
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intended to assist, but not direct, planning and 
measurement is, by definition, antithetical to 
a federalist form of government. Others argue 
that bottom-up approaches have no coherence 
and may not have significant impact at higher 
levels.
The answer lies in between and is a function 
of the particular issue. In connection with 
PPD-8, perhaps Christopher Bellavita is 
right in observing that putting up with all the 
“messiness, inefficiency and other faults” as the 
price to be paid for living within a federalist 
system of governance formed the main hurdle 
to be faced in the attempt to implement […the] 
earlier […HSPD-8] preparedness strategy.52
CONCLUSIONS
The preparedness program called for by PPD-
8 is extremely ambitious, with implications for 
how to proceed in future years. Expanded efforts 
can be made by the Obama Administration 
to place higher policy priority on and provide 
greater resources for getting the nation in a 
better preparedness position by the end of the 
president’s second term. On the other hand, 
even with such efforts, national preparedness 
may not move demonstrably ahead over the 
next few years. 
Keep Trying 
The game is not over. Further initiatives can 
and should continue to be taken to increase the 
chances of PPD-8 making a sustained imprint 
on national preparedness policies, programs, 
perceptions, and priorities. At the moment, 
however, the single most important step the 
Obama Administration can take is not only to 
make clear to the nation the need for enhancing 
our preparedness in the face of terrorist threats 
and natural disasters, but also to acknowledge 
the major challenges that must be overcome in 
implementing a national preparedness plan.53 
The aim would be to reinforce the need for the 
whole community to work on this problem, 
adapting solutions to local and regional 
conditions within broad federal guidelines, 
while at the same time seeking to lower 
expectations regarding the outcome being 
sought by the time this Administration leaves 
office. Care should be taken to acknowledge 
the existence of large uncertainties and 
complexities in understanding the dangers 
facing the nation from major natural disasters 
and terrorist attacks as well as the best ways to 
mitigate these challenges to reduce risk while 
adhering to our federalist system of governance.
Examples of specific steps to be considered 
in improving preparedness include:
1. Improving Stakeholder Engagement. 
The Administration has been working with 
federal, state, and local governments as well 
as NGO and the private sector to realize the 
objectives of PPD-8.54 However, it is not too 
late for DHS to take even more vigorous 
steps to engage all key stakeholders in the 
PPD-8 process. In doing so, policies and 
programs need to remain sensitive to the 
need for states and local communities to 
act in their own interests as long as this is 
not inconsistent with the thrust of the new 
preparedness strategy. More effort ought 
to be put into creating greater incentives 
for the private sector to enhance their 
preparedness, building on programs 
currently in place, which would offer 
financial assistance, tax write-offs, and the 
equivalent of a “good preparedness seal of 
approval” known as Resilience STARTM.55 
Practically speaking, resource limits will 
likely constrain how much effort can be put 
into more vigorous stakeholder engagement 
efforts.56
2. Fixing the NPR. The second report, issued 
two years after PPD-8, is much improved 
over the first edition, which sought to 
assess preparedness progress while PPD-
8 was replacing key elements of HSPD-8. 
Future NPR should be more heuristic than 
the first or second, with less false precision 
using low confidence numbers and typically 
unreliable percentages. They should 
manage expectations by acknowledging 
the difficulties of implementing and 
measuring preparedness progress at all 
levels, especially at the national level. 
Moreover, rather than a fruitless pursuit 
of practically unattainable performance 
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goals that presumably would eliminate 
risk, subsequent NPR ought to focus on 
the relative progress of PPD-8 toward the 
desired end state of managing risk. No 
matter how well put together, however, if 
subsequent NPR remain self-assessments, 
they will continue to suffer from credibility 
problems. Finally, some mechanism needs 
to be found for developing an independent 
assessment of the first draft of each NPR as 
produced by FEMA.57 
3. Developing an NPS “Do it yourself” 
Kit. The challenge here is how to find a 
balance between the somewhat simple 
2011 version of the NPS and what appears 
to be the production of each of the six NPS 
component parts in great detail.58 One idea 
would be an updated NPS that again pulls 
together all parts of this system in the form 
but this time in the form of a “do it yourself 
kit” for non-federal public and private 
users. This document would offer easy-to-
follow steps for each of the six components 
that reflect decent accuracy and note 
unavoidable uncertainties. Sections of the 
kit would include examples for different 
types of users of appropriate adaptation 
and prioritization of the PPD-8 national-
level core capabilities and targets for use 
in different categories of stakeholders, 
ranging from communities, to large urban 
areas, states, and regions comprised of 
many states. It would then go further to at 
least illustrate how risks, capability gaps, 
and solutions to enhance preparedness can 
be aggregated from local, to sub-state, to 
state levels across the nation. This can then 
lead to risk assessments for the ten FEMA 
Regions and ultimately provide national 
assessment input to the president via a 
series of NPR.59 
Success May Not Be Around the 
Corner 
Steps such as those summarized above can 
be useful. However, the experience thus far 
with PPD-8 implementation suggest that, as a 
practical matter, this initiative does not have a 
high chance of succeeding in reaching its stated 
goal. Many experts believe that HSPD-8 failed 
to make significant and sustained progress in 
meeting its preparedness objectives for the 
nation. By the time PPD-8 was published, 
there were examples galore of issues that led 
to HSPD-8 showing serious signs of failure.60 
If this were true for the less complex HSPD-
8, it would seem to be a serious warning flag 
for the success of PPD-8.61 Indeed, as noted in 
our discussion, PPD-8 may prove to be more 
difficult to implement than HSPD-8 because of 
its greater number of inherent complexities and 
the early confusion caused by an abrupt switch 
from one preparedness strategy to another.
The Goal defines success in the PPD-8 
context as “a secure …and resilient Nation 
with the capabilities required across the 
whole community to prevent, protect against, 
mitigate, respond to, and recover from the 
threats and hazards that pose the greatest 
risk.”62 Looked at another way, success is not 
only aimed at ensuring preparedness for all 
stakeholders across the country at all levels, but 
also designed to help reach the more expansive 
goal of ensuring that the whole community 
is prepared to cope with successful terrorist 
attacks and major national-level disasters. 
While well expressed, a key question 
associated with PPD-8 is how will success be 
measured? It is doubtful that there will be a 
magic measuring stick invented that could tell 
the president, the Congress, and the nation as a 
whole, how well PPD-8 implementation is going 
and how close the total efforts made under this 
Directive might come to reaching the rather 
broad end-state quoted above by the time the 
president leaves office. It would be misleading 
at best and dangerous at worst if the attempts 
to rate progress via the methods employed by 
the NPR are relied upon, even if best efforts 
are made to find better tools. It is the nature 
of wicked problems that issues such as success 
and failure are difficult if not impossible to 
assess in credible and objective ways. 
 We are clearly faced with a very wicked, 
wicked problem in seeking to develop a truly 
strategic view of the nation’s preparedness. 
As discussed, this would entail a horizontal 
and vertical hierarchical, analytically based 
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assessment method that poses significant 
analytic and governance challenges and may 
not be doable as a practical matter.
Realistically, all that can and should be done 
is to chip away at the problem at all levels, 
employ only well-tested and cost effective 
measures, and temper expectations. At the 
national level, this is the time to objectively 
debate the effectiveness and efficiency of 
our national preparedness strategy and 
capabilities. What is needed is not be some sort 
of pseudo-analytic formula for measurement, 
but an informed national perception of how 
well PPD-8 and other preparedness policies 
and programs have improved the country’s 
preparedness against a range of likely threats 
and hazards with nationwide implications and 
a set of low likelihood incidents that can cause 
high consequences.
The Road Ahead
If PPD-8 shows significant progress by the time 
President Obama leaves office, an incoming 
administration might decide to adopt a low-key 
effort that keeps slugging away at improving 
national preparedness. Less probable, but 
possible, would be a decision to undertake yet 
a third effort with the same thrust but a brand 
new name and number in the tradition of PPD-
8 and HSPD-8 before it.
If it appears that substantial progress in 
developing a feasible and meaningful national 
preparedness program has not been made by 
the time Obama leaves office, however, a new 
administration might simply decide that no 
credible nationwide approach to preparedness 
is workable in this large, diverse country with 
its special governance structure. This would 
of course allow for communities and all 
stakeholders to continue to prepare themselves 
as best they can with help from the federal 
government, but with no attempt to forge a 
common strategy and measure overall national 
preparedness. 
After diving into and digging out of this issue, 
this article argues that PPD-8 faces the reality 
of ultimately being overwhelmed by similar 
and equally powerful analytic difficulties and/
or governance impediments as the HSPD-8 
initiative before it. In sum, regarding overall 
national preparedness strategies, to the extent 
that proverbs can proscribe policy, it can be 
said that if a second attempt to attain sufficient 
and sustained national preparedness through 
PPD-8 is seen as not succeeding, it might not 
make sense to “try, try,[…and] try again.”63 
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NOTES
1.  The White House, Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-8) (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 
30, 2011).
2.  Ibid., 1. Although resilience is included in this definition, PPD-8 and its implementing documents do not apply this 
concept as a major strategic driver or practical planning factor. The focus is on preparedness, which produces resilience 
as one of its outcomes.
3.  As put by the Directive, while PPD-8 is “intended to galvanize action by the Federal Government, it is also aimed 
at facilitating an integrated, all-of-Nation, capabilities-based approach to preparedness […as] national preparedness is 
the shared responsibility of all levels of government, the private and nonprofit sectors, and individual citizens.” Ibid., 1.
4. The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)–8, National Preparedness (Washington 
DC: Government Printing Office, December 17, 2003).
5.  Those in the preparedness business when PPD-8 was issued were surprised.  As an example, an apparently 
disgruntled FEMA employee offered the following observations via a PPD-8 website created by this agency: “Since 
HSPD 8 is now replaced by PPD8, what has this done in regards to the training and direction that many of us have 
spent years teaching? …How much time and money will it draw away from other areas while 80% to 90% of the current 
training and documentation is changed to reflect these small changes? My question is, is it really worth the time and 
effort to go through all of this? …What were the driving factors to make this change? Were they driven by reality? Or was 
this just an expensive and time-consuming political stunt?”  Promoting Preparedness - (FEMA) - by IdeaScale fema.
ideascale.com/a/ideafactory.do?id=14692&mod.
6. As pointed out by a homeland security expert, the PPD-8 initiative does not refer to or recognize “what has and 
has not been accomplished since the last major preparedness directive was issued… [and] reads as though the past 
seven years never happened.”  See “Homeland Security’s Presidential Policy Directive: Two Steps Backwards,” Jena 
Baker McNeill and Matt A. Mayer, Heritage Foundation, April 14, 2011,  www.heritage.org/.../two-steps-backward-
homeland-security-presidential
7. Recent natural and accidental disasters across the nation include massive wildfires, floods, and hurricanes, as well 
as the fertilizer plant explosion in Texas.
8. A full side-by-side comparative analysis of these two directives is beyond the scope of this article, but important 
insights can be gained by looking back at HSPD-8 in considering the future of PPD-8.
9. PPD-8, 1. A capability is “the ability to provide the means to accomplish one or more tasks under specific 
conditions and to specific performance standards. A capability may be achieved with any combination of properly 
planned, organized, equipped, trained, and exercised personnel that achieves the intended outcome.” Jared T. Brown, 
Presidential Policy Directive 8 and the National Preparedness System:
Background and Issues for Congress (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, October 21, 2011), 15.
10. Capabilities-based planning, used by the Department of Defense and in the private sector, entails planning under 
uncertainty to provide capabilities suitable for a wide range of future challenges and circumstances. It involves working 
within a framework that considers costs and sustainability and necessitates prioritization and choice to enable officials 
at all levels to make informed choices that best strengthen homeland security capabilities. As applied to homeland 
security, capabilities-based planning serves as an analytic method for conducting risk assessments under uncertainty 
against all-hazard threats to develop the means to respond to a wide range of potential challenges and circumstances. For 
groundbreaking work on the challenges faced in applying capabilities based planning to homeland security see Sharon 
Caudle, “Homeland Security Capabilities-Based Planning: Lessons from the Defense Community,” Homeland Security 
Affairs I, no. 2 (Fall 2005),  http://www.hsaj.org/?article=1.2.2, and also her Homeland Security and Capability Based 
Planning: Improving National Capabilities , Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, September 2005, 49-
50,   http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a439372.pdf.
11.  Developing core capabilities with associated targets, and seeking to adapt these to the diverse needs of all relevant 
stakeholders, posed major analytic and governance related difficulties during the HSPD-8 era.  The Target Capability 
List (TCL) was surrounded in controversy from the start. The TCL established national targets for performance and 
resource capabilities across the prevent, protect, respond, and recover mission areas.  Seventy-one critical capabilities 
were initially identified, which differ in substantive detail as well as numbers from the thirty-one TCs developed for 
PDD-8. Moreover, the TCL issued under HSPD-8 contained only thirty-seven of the seventy-one initial capabilities. 
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Developing, implementing, and evaluating the core capabilities associated with PPD-8 are likely to experience many 
of the same inherent challenges that were experienced in the earlier HSPD-8 attempt to realize preparedness core 
capabilities. For groundbreaking work on the challenges faced in applying capabilities based planning to homeland 
security see Sharon Caudle, as referenced above.
12. Relying on unclassified and unrestricted information, a good faith effort was made by the author to discover 
the process by which the core capabilities were constructed and performance targets developed under PPD-8. Non-
governmental analyses are few and official sources are overly general, for example, Learn About Presidential Policy 
Directive-8,  FEMA.govwww.fema.gov/learn-about-presidential-policy-directive-8. One useful source is the statement 
by Sharon L. Caudle, Ph.D., Younger-Carter Distinguished Policymaker in Residence and Visiting Lecturer, The 
Bush School of Government and Public Service Texas A&M University, House Committee on Homeland Security, 
Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management: Is DHS Effectively Implementing a Strategy to Counter 
Emerging Threats? February 3, 2012. As to setting numerical target levels for certain TCs, such attempts convey a sense 
of credibility and precision, are often not well supported, and can be highly misleading. For example, for the capability 
designated “ Screening, Search, and Detection,” the Target Capability found in the Goal is conveyed as “screen 67,500 
people associated with an imminent terrorist threat or act using technical, non-technical, intrusive, or non-intrusive 
means.”, National Preparedness Goal 1st Edition, Table 2 (Washington DC: September 2011), 3. In such situations, the 
author likes to cite the saying attributed to John Maynard Keynes, “it is better to be roughly right than precisely wrong.” 
http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/265041-it-is-better-to-be-roughly-right-than-precisely-wrong.
13.  “Every member of the entire nation takes actions to strengthen  their preparedness by adapting and applying […
the national ] core capabilities for each mission area as relevant to the threats and hazards they expect to experience—
including individuals, communities, the private and nonprofit sectors, faith based organizations, and Federal, state, and 
local governments. By so doing, they not only improve their preparedness, but also make overall national preparedness 
stronger.” The Goal, 1.
14.  The “whole community” is the current term for characterizing the different types and sizes of stakeholders not only 
at federal level, but across the country to include private as well as public stakeholders at state and local government 
levels, a wide range of cities/urban areas and communities, large and small private businesses, non-governmental 
organizations (NGO), and concerned citizens and families. It has largely replaced the term “Homeland Security 
Enterprise.”
15.  One major impediment to success, as put by GAO two years ago is the lack of “national preparedness capability 
requirements based on established metrics to provide a framework for… assessing federal, state, and local preparedness 
capabilities against capability requirements to identify capability gaps for prioritizing investments in national 
preparedness.” See Measuring Disaster Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Limited Progress in Assessing National 
Capabilities, Testimony by William O. Jenkins, Jr., GAO Director Homeland Security and Justice Before the Committee 
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, Statement United States Government Accountability 
Office (Washington DC. March 17, 2011), 9-10. This continues to be an issue needing to be resolved.
16.  The PPD-8 Implementation Plan specifically calls for the secretary of Homeland Security “to conduct a strategic, 
national-level risk assessment to identify the relevant risk factors that guide where core capabilities are needed and 
develop a list of the capabilities, […capability targets], and associated performance objectives for all hazards that will 
measure progress toward their achievement.” Implementation Plan for Presidential Policy Directive 8: National 
Preparedness (Washington, DC: May 2011), 2. Against a five-year planning period, the SNRA assessed risk as a function 
of frequency and consequences for a set of 24 national-level events. The methodology incorporated data from a variety 
of inputs, including leveraging existing models and assessments, the historical record, and expert judgment. SNRA 
produced risk-informed results were used to develop and prioritize the national core capabilities. What we know is 
based on an unclassified summary issued by FEMA, the Strategic National Risk Assessment in Support of PPD 8: 
A Comprehensive Risk-Based Approach toward a Secure and Resilient Nation (Washington DC: FEMA, December 
2011), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/rma-strategic-national-risk-assessment-ppd8.pdf.  Without access to 
classified materials, it is not possible to check how these risk outcomes shaped national capabilities and targets and 
whether any capabilities were solidified without flowing from a credible risk assessment.
17.  Perhaps it was recognized, upon a closer look, that adapting the SNRA to regional and local levels is not easily 
accomplished. A single methodology might not be applicable. Even with a credible national level risk assessment using 
the national core capabilities and a set of generic scenarios, there are special challenges in determining the methodology, 
level of detail, and data requirements to support risk assessments by communities and other public and private entities 
in various locations exposed to different threats and hazards.
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18.  Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) Guide, First Edition, CPG 202 (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, April 2012). PPD-8 is based on the premise that all communities need to conduct 
risk assessments of the threats and hazards they face in order to make informed decisions about the capabilities they 
must deploy in order to manage risk.
19.  For example, see the work done by the Community and Regional Resilience Institute (CARRI), www.resilientus.
org/  See also, Jerome Kahan , et al, Community Resilience Profiles: Assessment and Evaluation, Final Report, 
Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute, December 19, 2011, www.dhs.gov/homeland-security-studies-and-
analysis-institute-hssai
20.  There are many public and private entities below the national level besides communities, such as the interstate 
regions, individual states and territories, major metropolitan areas, all kinds of smaller jurisdictions and localities as 
well as different slices of critical infrastructure, hosts of NGO, and multitudes of large and small businesses.
21.  THIRA, 3.
22.  Even experts find it challenging to develop threat assessments requiring estimates of likelihoods and consequences 
set within credible scenarios for each stakeholder facing particular dangers. See National Research Council, Review of 
the Department of Homeland Security’s Approach to Risk Analysis (National Academies Press, 2011). On-the-ground 
assistance can be of great value in adapting and applying normative risk principles to local capability needs, but DHS 
cannot afford to send experts to all the cities, communities, and localities across the nation, let alone meet the needs of 
concerned citizens.
23.  More specifically, the Guide fails to properly articulate address whether the proposed risk method is feasible 
when applied by a wide spectrum of users facing different threats and circumstances; the degree to which the varied 
technical abilities of users are sufficient to execute the method and apply results; and the implications of differing levels 
of stakeholder interest in high priority risk assessments for preparedness planning. Another impediment integrating 
risk assessments from top to bottom is the fact that risks aggregated upwards to the national level would be based on 
THIRA, which turns out not to be directly related to the earlier top-down SNRA effort!
24.  FEMA, National Preparedness System, (Washington DC: Department of Homeland Security, November 2011) 
wwwfema.gov/pdf/prepared/nps_description.pdf .  In the interest of keeping the public informed as the NPS moves 
forward, FEMA has a website that explains the components of the NPS and provides specific tools and resources to help 
communities and individuals through the NPS cycle. At http://www.fema.gov/national-preparedness-system
25.  The NPS uses the word “you” quite often, as in “you coordinate your plans with other organizations,” and uses 
informal expressions such as “Now it’s time to see if your activities are working as intended.”  This tone has the ambience 
as if someone from FEMA is having a nice chat about preparedness in someone’s living room.
26.  Capability Estimation Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 201, second edition, FEMA, April 2013.
27.  Community refers broadly to all types of communities, including communities of practice, communities defined 
by geography (regions and jurisdictions), and communities with other shared interests. Resources typically refers to 
personnel, teams, facilities, equipment, and  supplies, but is here expanded to include plans, procedures, strategies, 
training, exercises, programs, systems, technologies, services, funding, authorities, laws,  ordinances, and policies.” 
CPG, 2.
28.  The following passages, drawn somewhat arbitrarily from different pages of CPG 201 give a flavor of some of the 
issues involved. “This analysis compares current resource levels to the desired capability targets… or each capability 
target, communities should examine current resource levels using information from real-world incidents, assessments, 
planning processes, and exercises. This examination may involve additional information gathering and research in 
partnership with whole community partners, including those from the private and nonprofit sectors, faith-based 
organizations, and community-based organizations… This strategy should take into account existing community 
resources, resources from non-traditional partners, mutual aid agreements and partnerships, partners at other levels of 
government, and, lastly, grant investments.  Communities should pull from and consult with strategic, operational, and 
tactical plans, including emergency operations, hazard mitigation, comprehensive/land use, economic development, 
housing, resource protection,  transportation, and recovery plans; after action reports, improvement plans, and other 
capability assessments; local and regional planning groups…;  groups representing those with disabilities and others 
with access and functional needs; trusted public-private relationships and working groups such as local business  and 
industry groups…, and laws, authorities, policies, and procedures…When communities successfully implement this 
strategy, the THIRA capability targets may need  to be reduced. …This would then require revision of this capability 
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estimation process.”  As a former (Adjunct) Professor, the author can only remind the reader that there will be a short 
Q&A test on this material!
29.  The Frameworks follow the whole community approach to preparedness, which recognizes that everyone can 
contribute to and benefit from national preparedness efforts. Each Framework explains the guiding principles and 
scope of mission area; summarizes the roles and responsibilities of each part of the whole community; defines the 
mission area’s core capabilities, along with key examples of critical tasks; defines coordinating structures—either new or 
existing—that enable the whole community to work together to deliver the core capabilities; describes the relationships 
to the other mission areas; identifies relevant information to help with operational planning; and provides information 
that state, local, tribal and territorial governments can use to revise their operational plans.   See National Planning 
Frameworks at FEMA.gov  www.fema.gov/national-planning-frameworks
30.  The National Disaster Recovery, National Prevention, National Mitigation Framework, and second edition of the 
National Response Framework have been released, with the National Protection Framework to be released later to 
conform with the evolution of national protection policy. Ibid.
31.  FEMA Has Made Progress, but Additional Steps Are Needed to Improve Grant Management and Assess 
Capabilities, Government Accountability Office, GAO-13-637 (June 25, 2013), 1, at http://www.gao.gov/products/
GAO-13-637T
32.    In 2011, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) highlighted a number of issues that Congress may wish to 
oversee as the Administration “creates and implements” its many elements. These include “evaluating how PPD-8 
policies conform with statute; how federal roles and responsibilities have been assigned to implement and execute 
PPD-8 policies; how non-federal resources and stakeholders will be impacted by national preparedness guidance; and 
how the overall federal budget may be reprioritized by a new national preparedness goal.”  Jared T. Brown, Presidential 
Policy Directive 8 and the National Preparedness System: Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: 
CRS, October 21, 2011), Summary.
33.  On this point, in what is surely an understatement, CPG 201 notes that NPS components continuously affect each 
other, but does not demonstrate these dynamics. What is presumably meant are such interactions as TSA, CBP, and 
ICE work together at airports to detect and deal with the risk of terrorists entering the country using illegal immigration 
documents when arriving in country.
34.  NPR 2013, Fact sheet
35.  National Preparedness Report (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, March 30, 2012, and 
National Preparedness Report, March 30, 2013.
36.  The 2013 NPR relies upon approximately 1,400 sources and 3,200 measures and metrics that contribute to 
analysis of the core capabilities and related targets identified in the Goal. Inputs were elicited from all types and levels 
of public and private partner, which are then systematically synthesized by FEMA into observations on capability 
progress achieved.
37.  State Preparedness Reports (SPR) have been produced annually starting in 2007 under the HSPD-8 framework. 
The results of the THIRA risk and capability estimation processes for states and territories receiving Federal 
preparedness assistance are reported annually through the State Preparedness Report (SPR). They initially reflected 
self-assessments of how the TCL was meeting its thirty-seven target capabilities under HSPD-8 initiative, changing 
as the initial TCL changed, and refocusing themselves as PPD-8 replaced HSPD-8 with its thirty-one core capabilities 
and targets. FEMA published an online, interactive tool that guides states and territories through the SPR assessment 
process to ensure consistency of data and continued implementation of the capability assessment aspect of the National 
Preparedness System. See State Preparedness Report Guidance, Fiscal Year 2008, Department of Homeland Security.
38.  The SSR concept arose in December 2004, when the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) requested that states 
designate Sub-State Regions for homeland security. Reflecting their own histories and preferences, different states 
have chosen to build SSRs using a variety of structures and organizing principles. Many SSR are organized according 
to emergency preparedness needs keyed to natural disasters as opposed to terrorist threats. Some states designate SSR 
only for periodic preparedness planning, not for sustained preparedness assessments.
39.   NPR 2012, 3.
40.   NPR 2012, 1. A unique challenge faced by the first NPR was handling the transition from HSPD-8 to PPD-8, 
which entailed working with the new set of thirty-one PPD-8 core capabilities while facilitating a transition from the 
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old to the new system. This complicated efforts to identify measurable performance and assessment data to determine 
annual yearly progress in implementing. Given the press of time to get the first NPR out the door, the FEMA team was 
forced to assess the county’s overall preparedness progress by utilizing existing assessment approaches and associated 
data based on the old capabilities and targets associated with HSPD-8, not the new PDD-8 core capabilities and their 
associated performance targets. For this and other reasons, this first NPR candidly acknowledges that “the rating 
system used to score target capability goal performance on a scale of 100% is not reliable and…in many cases, measures 
and metrics do not yet exist to gauge performance […for use as] a reliable source of deficiencies nor  for that matter of 
successes.” NPR 2012, 60.
41.  As articulated in the 2013 NPR, “ trends in national preparedness will be increasingly evident in future reports, as 
the NPR development process continues to mature and incorporates additional input from across the whole community 
[… and] more significant changes in levels of capability and overall national preparedness will become clearer by 
evaluating trends across multiple years.” NPR 2013, 1.
42.  NPR 2013, 12.
43.  The intent of an early test program, held in 2006, was to learn important lessons about real implementation 
challenges for HSPD-8 and significantly revise the methodology for further use in measuring the preparedness level of 
States. Working with FEMA, six States conducted Pilot Capability Assessments (PCAs). Each PCA was subjected to a 
self-assessment, with inputs from a selected number of SSRs in each State.  All this effort led to uneven, inconsistent, 
and not analytically based outcomes.  Many difficulties arose in implementation and funding. Some believe that this 
program represented a good start, but it faded away.  See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Preparedness 
Directorate, Office of Grants and Training, Pilot Capabilities Assessment (PCA): RDSTF Region 3, September 15, 2006, 
and RDSTF Region 7, July 17, 2006. See also FEMA, “Measuring Effectiveness – Capabilities Assessment,” http://
fema.ideascale.com/a/dtd/Measuring-Effectiveness-Capabilities-Assessment/316114-14692 Further complicating this 
process is the continued growth of intra and cross state regional cooperation on homeland security. This has led to 
an evolving structure of layered and often overlapping cooperative arrangements at various levels across the nation, 
reflecting different purposes and defined through various organizing principles. How to account for these arrangements 
in developing intra state and regional  risk assessments without facing such issues as double counting and merging 
differing methodologies is quite demanding.
44.  FEMA Has Made Progress, GAO-13-637, June 25, 2013.
45.  See Ozzie Mascarenhas, “Innovation as Defining and Resolving Wicked Problems,” http://www.google.
com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCcQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fweaverjm.
faculty.udmercy.edu%2FMascarenhasLectureNotes%2FMascarenhasWickedproblems.doc&ei=Rv_
zUq71DsPdoAS2yIGIBg&usg=AFQjCNFa8lMBrjeiuoUfsnY6i1vsHR_TZA&sig2=U95veKrqyfn4nJpj-1qebw May 11, 
2009 at On Wicked Problems and their Solution Strategies. For the homeland security context, see Jay Rosen, “What 
Are Journalists For?” PressThink.org, 2005.
46.  FEMA Has Made Progress, but Additional Steps Are Needed to Improve Grant Management and Assess 
Capabilities, Government Accountability Office, GAO-13-637 (June 25, 2013), 1, at http://www.gao.gov/products/
GAO-13-637T
47.  Assessing National Preparedness: Integrating and Aggregating Capability Assessments, Homeland Security 
Studies and Analysis Institute (HSSAI), Final Report, 28 March 2007, Prepared for the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), Preparedness Directorate, for the National Preparedness Task Force. At the moment, the HSSAI 
document remains designated For Official Use Only (FOUO), meaning it contains information that may be exempt 
from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 522). For this reason, it must be controlled, stored, 
handled, transmitted, distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information, and 
not to be released to the public or other personnel who do not have a valid need to know without prior approval of an 
authorized DHS official.  Contact author for suggestions on how access might be obtained.
48.   Assessing national preparedness might use a form of network analysis, but this method has apparently not been 
developed for this purpose. See Andrew Gelman, “Multilevel Hierarchical Modeling: what it can and can’t do” (June 
1, 2005), 1, http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~russell/classes/cs294/f05/papers/gelman-2005.pdf; No Child Left Behind: 
A Roadmap for State Implementation (Washington, DC: November 10, 2005), http://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/
account/roadmap/roadmap.pdf.
49. The Goal, 3.
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50.  To the author, PPD-8 wins the complexity battle. For example, PPD-8 adds a fifth mission of mitigation to the four 
used in HSPD-8,  provides a risk methodology for stakeholders to adapt and apply that is not done in HSPD-8; focuses 
on a National Preparedness System with Planning Frameworks playing a prominent role unlike HSPD-9, and calls for 
annual national-level progress reports that have no formal counterpart in HSPD-8.
51.  Corey Gruber, at that time Director of the DHS Office of Grants and Training, cited in Sharon Caudle, “Homeland 
Security and Capabilities-Based Planning: Improving National Preparedness,” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, September 2005), 33.
52.  Christopher Bellavita, Homeland Security Watch, Preparedness and Response, April 12, 2011, www.hlswatch.
com/2011/04/page/2/. For analyses of federalism as it relates to homeland security, see Pietro S. Nivola, “Reflections 
on Homeland Security and American Federalism,” The Brookings Institution (Working Paper), May 13, 2002 and 
Samuel H. Clovis Jr. “Federalism, Homeland Security and National Preparedness: A Case Study in the Development of 
Public Policy,” Homeland Security Affairs 2, no. 3 (October 2006).
53.  What the President does not need is a repeat of the way ObamaCare was advertized, where the whole story was not 
made public at the beginning of public rollout – i.e., “if you like your plan, you can keep it!”
54.  Among the many ongoing outreach efforts is the idea of National Preparedness Months, where FEMA provides 
tool kits with “suggestions” for activities and events that state, local, tribal and territorial governments, business, 
non-governmental organizations, and community organizations could sponsor to promote the initiative. Toolkits also 
include templates and drafts of newsletter articles, blogs, posters, and other collateral material that local as well as state 
and federal organizations can use y in various outreach efforts.
55.  One effort along these lines is a pilot, voluntary certification program that aims to make homes and buildings 
more secure and resilient to all hazards. Homes that receive a Resilience STAR™ designation will be awarded one to 
five stars, five being the highest level of capabilities attained. See Secretary Janet Napolitano before a Senate Committee 
on the Judiciary hearing, “The Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security,” April 25, 2012. See also Homeland 
Security News Wire, August 2o, 2013. This is consistent with PPD-8 calling for “private-sector programs to enhance 
national resilience.” PPD-8, 3.
56.  One aspect of PPD-8’s attempt to engage stakeholders is its calls for a comprehensive campaign to build and 
sustain national preparedness. As part of this overall effort, the administration developed a public outreach and 
feedback program called the Campaign to Build and Sustain Preparedness. FEMA also established a website to 
facilitate interaction with the public in terms of progress made and suggestions from stakeholders regarding content 
and implementation of PPD-8. There are limits, however, as to how effective this outreach and feedback program 
can be in helping stakeholders and the public understand, accept, and execute the PPD-8 plans. In principle, a more 
“hands on” approach with FEMA officials interacting on a sustained basis with community leaders, non-governmental 
organizations, businesses, and interested citizens has greater potential to have a significant impact. In practice, 
however, this would require a costly increase in developing a well-trained and large enough outreach force, which is 
likely to prove prohibitive.
57.  For example, DHS could ask the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute (HSSAI), its Federally Funded 
Research and Development Center (FFRDC), to conduct such an assessment, consistent with its charter. It would be 
beneficial if independent reviews could also be done for each of the SSR assessments and each of the sub-state inputs 
to the State reports, but these may simply not be practical, especially the latter.
58.  The sum of all these individual PPD-8 products might, if printed and stacked, compete in size with the hard copy 
set of the Encyclopedia Britannica volumes some readers may still have adorning their bookshelves.
59.  The kit would also contain links to an available database of estimated likelihoods and consequences for different 
hazards in connection with different types and sizes of communities, urban areas, regions as well as businesses, and other 
entities. Also part of the kit would be a National Planning System Guide for creating and maintaining the Frameworks 
and operational plans required to make all parts of the overall NPS work for all users—an effort that is supposed to be 
underway if not yet completed.   www.fema.gov/pdf/prepared/nps_description.pdf. The last part of the kit, perhaps in 
an appendix, would demonstrate how results could be horizontally integrated and vertically aggregated to get a national 
level assessment by mission, capability, and stakeholder type (along the lines of the limited access HSSAI report, which 
could be officially approved for public release, assuming FEMA takes this initiative.
60.    Recall such issues as publishing a TCL that includes only half of the core capabilities identified and neglecting to 
provide stakeholders with risk assessment guidelines.
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 10 Article 2 (February 2014) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Kahan,  Preparedness Revisited  17
61.  Some might see the Obama PPD-8 initiative as largely a repeat of HSPD-8 with few changes that matter. Others 
might see PPD-8 as having more elements and adding more layers of detail than HSPD-8. Still others might hold the 
view that PPD- 8 seems to be “a modest evolution of HSPD 8, with more attention to a broader set of stakeholders, and 
with at least the hint of more flexibility about what preparedness means”….Christopher Bellavita,  Homeland Security 
Watch, “Preparedness and Response” (April 12, 2011) http://www.hlswatch.com/2011/04/12/there-is-a-quality-even-
meaner-than-outright-ugliness/  See also Philip J. Palin, “PPD-8 as a natural evolution of HSPD-8: Preparedness and 
Response,” Homeland Security Watch, April 9, 2011, and Jared Brown, Presidential Policy Directive 8 and the National 
Preparedness System: Background and Issues for Congress, CRS Report (Washington D.C,  October 21, 2011).Past 
experience does not always govern future performance. If the earlier HSPD-8 experience did not work well, however, 
useful lessons can be learned on what not to do, but not necessarily on how to solve problems the second time around.
62.  The Goal, 1.
63.  This saying, originally with its three “tries,” was popularized by educator Edward Hickson (1803-70) in his Moral 
Song. It is now applicable in any of its forms, to all activities, not just educational. Oxford Dictionary of Proverbs (New 
York: Random House, 1996), 154.
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ABSTRACT:
Hybrid Targeted Violence (HTV) is defined as an 
intentional use of force to cause physical injury 
or death to a specifically identified population 
using multifaceted conventional weapons and 
tactics. This article introduces the HTV concept 
to challenge first responders to prepare for 
violent “hybrid” multi-threat incidents. These 
incidents may involve conventional weapons, 
the use of fire as a weapon, chemical weapons, 
and/or improvised explosives. Attacks 
of this nature defy conventional thinking 
about the role of police, fire, and emergency 
medical professionals.  HTV events demand 
cooperative strategies to efficiently neutralize 
complex threats that are beyond the capacity 
of a single first responder discipline. Recent 
and historical HTV incidents are identified to 
reinforce the compelling need for a paradigm 
shift in thinking that goes beyond conventional 
“active shooter” scenarios that do not advance 
“Whole Community” interdependent response 
strategies.
INTRODUCTION 
Mass casualty attacks in the United States 
immediately capture the attention of the 
nation. These horrific and calculated acts 
garner international media attention due to the 
compelling questions of “why” and “how” such 
an atrocity could occur. While mass murder 
rampages in non-combatant environments 
are perceived by many to be a modern 
phenomenon, they are neither new nor are 
they growing at epidemic rates. Despite the low 
frequency of these events, they dramatically 
impact countless individuals, communities, 
and nations by instilling fear that such events 
can unpredictably occur in urban, suburban 
and metropolitan areas. The recent Nairobi 
Westgate Mall Attack, the Washington Navy 
Yard shooting, and the protracted Boston 
Marathon bombing and subsequent violence 
all underscore the diversity of the communities 
impacted by targeted violence. 
Events involving sophisticated planning, 
varieties of weapons, and complex tactics 
will undoubtedly persist globally in highly 
unpredictable patterns. International political 
attention and intense media coverage of mass 
casualty attacks in Africa, South Asia, and the 
United States have led domestic public safety 
professionals to consider mitigation, response, 
and recovery strategies for these low-frequency 
high-risk terror driven events.1 The high profile 
lethality of these seemingly senseless acts of 
violence has raised the public’s expectation 
that first responders be poised to rapidly and 
skillfully protect potential victims in areas 
that have minimal protection, such as schools, 
houses of worship, workplaces, and public 
gathering venues.  
The current Department of Homeland 
Security definition of an active shooter is 
“an individual actively engaged in killing or 
attempting to kill people in a confined and 
populated area; in most cases, active shooters 
use firearm(s) and there is no pattern or method 
to their selection of victims.”2 That definition 
does not adequately describe for first responders 
or the public the dynamic crime scenes that may 
involve a variety of lethal weapons and mobile 
attackers, and are not restricted to a singular 
location. The active shooter label is no longer 
sufficient to accurately describe the enhanced 
threats that public safety will certainly be called 
upon to resolve. The active shooter label also 
does not provide a sufficiently descriptive term 
to comprehend the broad range of weapons and 
tactics that may be used in an act of targeted 
violence.    
Influencing changes in thinking, training, 
and tactics requires a more explanatory term 
to describe these complex threats. Hybrid 
Targeted Violence (HTV) has been defined as an 
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intentional use of force to cause physical injury 
or death to a specifically identified population 
using multifaceted conventional weapons and 
tactics.3 We suggest this definition, based on 
“hybrid” weapons and tactics, better captures 
the operational range of hazards confronting 
first responders and the communities they 
serve.     
HTV assaults often use a combination of 
lethal conventional weapons (i.e. fire as a 
weapon, firearms, improvised explosive devices, 
chemical weapons, etc.) and a combination of 
well-planned tactics (i.e. ambush, breaching, 
barricading, maneuver, etc.). (See figure 1). The 
compound effect of this form of violence requires 
a more synergistic response strategy. Research 
associated with integrated responses to school 
violence has found significant inadequacies 
in training and interagency communication.4 
Effective HTV response strategies blur lines 
between traditional law enforcement, fire, 
and emergency medical service duties and 
responsibilities. A common and cooperative 
operating picture must drive first responder 
decision making at chaotic HTV events. All 
responders must be principally focused on 
threat elimination and lethality reduction. 
This cooperative level of response can only be 
achieved through pre-event dialogue, planning, 
and joint public safety discipline HTV exercises.
(Multiple Weapons) + (Targeted Population) + (Planned Violent Action) = HTV
Example:
(Small Arms) + (School Population) + (Ambush Tactics) = HTV
Figure 1: Hybrid Targeted Violence formula and example.
Targeted violence directed towards innocent 
and defenseless people, especially children, 
demands a highly competent, rational reaction. 
Professionals must extract lessons from past 
events to better prevent, disrupt, and mitigate 
future attacks. The reality of confronting an 
armed attacker who has employed fire or 
explosives to actively kill people confounds 
the traditional roles that define which first 
responders engage a threat and which first 
responders stage until the scene is secure. 
The lack of engagement due to awaiting scene 
security by law enforcement and the cost 
associated with delayed Fire and Emergency 
Medical Services engagement was clearly 
documented in the Rand Corporation’s Lessons 
on Mumbai report.5 Future HTV incidents 
require first responders to engage as members 
of the same team, not members of role-defined 
public safety disciplines, to save lives and 
neutralize a no-notice rapidly lethal attack.
LEVERAGING LESSONS OF THE 
PAST
Preparation for future HTV events requires 
an appreciation for historical incidents while 
maintaining a keen awareness for impending 
threats. Past events that have involved 
combinations of ambush strategies, explosive 
devices, firearms, and other targeted assault 
tactics are relevant educational resources. 
First responders have the opportunity to glean 
valuable training lessons from these events by 
comparing local resources against actual HTV 
tactics. Introspective assessments involving all 
first responder disciplines are likely to reveal 
collective strengths and individual weaknesses. 
Following the Sandy Hook Elementary 
School Attack and the Aurora Colorado Theater 
Ambush, the New York Police Department 
published a revised active shooter risk mitigation 
report.6 The NYPD’s report provides a global 
analysis of HTV incidents with sufficient detail 
to permit further research involving primary 
reference sources. A worldwide frame of 
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reference is beneficial when studying both HTV 
tactics and HTV response strategies by first 
responders in non-combatant environments. 
Examples of noteworthy attacks that can 
serve as the basis of first responder HTV 
awareness and training include:
• May 18, 1927: Bath Township Michigan 
School Massacre: Ambush, bombing, fire as 
weapon, and shooting.7 
• December 30, 1974: Olean New York High 
School Attack: Ambush, bombing, fire as 
weapon, and shooting.8
• April 20, 1999: Columbine Colorado High 
School Attack: Ambush, fire as weapon, 
IED’s, and shooting.9
• December 9, 2003: Visalia California 
PrintXcel Plant Attack: Multiple fires as 
weapons and shooting.10
• November 26, 2008: Mumbai India 
Coordinated Attacks: Ambush, barricading 
tactics, explosives, fire as weapon, military 
maneuver tactics, and shooting.11
• August 27, 2010: McKinney Texas 
Department of Public Safety Ambush: 
Ambush, fire as weapon, and shooting.12
• July 22, 2011: Oslo Norway Parliament 
and Children’s Camp Attack: Ambush, 
distraction vehicle borne improvised 
explosive device  (VBIED), maneuver 
techniques, and shooting.13
• December 13, 2011: Liege, Belgium Saint-
Lambert Attack: Ambush, shooting, and 
stun grenades.14
• July 20, 2012: Aurora Colorado Theater 
Attack: Ambush, chemical weapons, 
explosive booby traps and shooting.15
• December 14, 2012: Sandy Hook Elementary 
School Attack: Ambush, breaching tactics, 
and shooting.16
• December 24, 2012: Webster New York 
Firefighter Ambush: Ambush, fire as 
weapon, and shooting.17 
• April 15-21, 2013:  Boston Marathon 
Bombing and Suspect Pursuit: Ambush, 
improvised explosive devices (pressure 
cooker bombs), and shooting.18
• September 16, 2013: Washington Navy 
Yard Shooting: Ambush and shooting.19 
• September 21-23, 2013: Westgate Shopping 
Centre Attack in Nairobi, Kenya: Ambush: 
barricading tactics, explosives, fire as 
weapon, military maneuver tactics, and 
shooting.20 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
and United States Secret Service (USSS) are 
engaged in ongoing efforts to catalog and 
analyze events involving mass casualties and 
violence targeted at specific populations, such as 
schools. An advisory published in December of 
2012 by the Department of Homeland Security 
and the FBI calls for increased vigilance and 
coordinated response plans across functional 
disciplines based on the study of over 100 
multi-victim attacks between 2000 and 2012.21 
The USSS remains an authority on school 
campus related violence. The USSS led study, 
“Campus Attacks: Targeted Violence Affecting 
Institutions of Higher Education,” provides 
both historical and visionary perspectives 
on “soft target” environments for no-notice 
violence.22 Artifacts from past HTV incidents 
and empirical analysis of HTV trends are readily 
available to facilitate the improvement of public 
safety community response capabilities.    
Incidents of hybrid targeted violence and less 
sophisticated targeted violence have achieved 
high levels of lethality in both domestic and 
international venues. Federal, state, local, and 
tribal government officials are embracing the 
reality that these threats may present. With 
little to no notice, individual responders must 
have well-crafted strategies to cooperatively 
address active threats involving firearms, 
improvised explosives, fire as a weapon, and 
military style barricading and maneuvering 
techniques. The well-documented and studied 
history of these events are worthy of ongoing 
study to shape future response strategies.
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COLLECTIVE PARADIGM SHIFT
Executive and operational leaders need to 
make the transition from analyzing historical 
HTV lessons to planning for future HTV 
attacks with local resources. These leaders 
must remain cognizant of the fact that HTV 
events occur with little or no notice; therefore, 
realistic strategies and resourcing expectations 
should be established. The Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) utilizes a “Whole 
Community” approach, engaging with members 
of the community as collaborative resources 
to enhance the resiliency and security of our 
nation. This engagement is necessary to relieve 
first responders of the restrictions associated 
with traditional “stage until the scene is 
secured” ideologies that are insufficient for no 
notice high-risk violent events.
There is considerable confusion and chaos at 
the start of HTV events, so much that the initial 
first responders rely heavily on training and 
past experiences to recognize and react to the 
atypical threats. The problem is that effective 
HTV responses involve multiple disciplines 
working collectively yet most public safety 
disciplines (police, fire, EMS, etc.) historically 
train in isolation from one another. Executive 
and line level first responders should be 
engaged in collaborative pre-event “if-then” 
dialogues. These conversations and tabletop 
exercises can benefit from no-notice scenarios 
that involve known casualties, the immediate 
threat of additional casualties, fire being used 
as a weapon, and uncontained armed attackers. 
These scenarios will demand a coordinated 
response from police, fire, and emergency 
medical services leveraging sound tactical 
protocols to address dynamic threats.  
What is evident in all of these scenarios is a 
need for change in the traditional roles of each 
organization dispatched to a HTV event. The 
public, the media, and even first responders 
look to the law enforcement community alone 
to manage incidents involving violent criminal 
conduct. Television coverage amplifies the 
visual of police and SWAT officers running to the 
scene wearing body armor and carrying tactical 
firearms. Initial images of the Columbine and 
Virginia Tech school shootings portrayed 
the fire department and emergency medical 
community in the “staging” area awaiting the 
police to deem the area safe or bring patients to 
them. The operational and technical resources 
that these “staged” disciplines bring to a HTV 
scene should be immediately utilized in a 
manner that capitalizes on their capacities 
in order to extinguish the threat an attacker 
presents to civilians and responders. Balancing 
first responder safety against taking life-
saving action is a critical piece of calculus that 
warrants an assessment of tactical and logistical 
capabilities against HTV hazards.  
A collective paradigm shift in first responder 
perspectives and cultures is necessary to better 
address hybrid threats and targeted violence. 
Discipline-centered basic and advanced training 
has not fostered a spirit of dynamic cooperation 
at crime scenes or on the fire ground. For 
example, police officers are trained to address 
acts of violence, firefighters are trained to fight 
structure fires, and EMT’s are trained to care 
for the injured. These fundamental roles are 
not realistically applicable during a HTV event.
When roles overlap, leaders across 
disciplines must question the methods of 
interoperability. For example, under the current 
model, can police officers, firefighters, and 
EMT’s simultaneously engage an active shooter 
within a burning building when lethal injuries 
are being inflicted every few seconds? Hard 
questions must be addressed with an honest 
self-assessment. Introspective organizational 
self-assessments should ideally occur before 
a HTV crisis is experienced. A culture of 
interdependence and resource sharing must be 
stimulated in a training environment in order 
to be inculcated in an operational environment.
TRAINING
During a HTV event, first responders are 
making split-second decisions involving tasks 
and responsibilities outside their traditional 
response domain, and therefore outside their 
general areas of expertise. It is commonly 
accepted that under stress, most responders 
will revert to what they have been trained 
to do. While it is easy to criticize the choices 
made during an event, making instantaneous 
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decisions is a difficult task in which instincts, 
prior training, and knowledge come into play. 
Each discipline commonly derives lessons 
learned and future response strategies from 
actual attacks and complex disasters that have 
occurred in the past. Thoughtful operational 
research has the potential to inform and educate 
those who may be called to respond to the 
next Aurora Theater Attack, Boston Marathon 
Bombing, or Nairobi Westgate Mall Attack. 
One of the most recognizable paradigm 
shifts in law enforcement tactics occurred 
after the Columbine High School shooting 
in 1999. According to the Columbine Review 
Commission, during the forty-six-minute 
rampage, “no efforts were made [by law 
enforcement] to engage, contain, or capture 
the perpetrators”23 Based on the findings of the 
report, law enforcement policy and training 
now emphasize that the highest priority of 
arriving law enforcement officers is to rapidly 
stop any ongoing assault. During this same 
incident, fire and emergency medical service 
resources were staged away from the hot scene 
due to protocols in place at the time. This 
“stage until safe” approach resulted in 3½ 
hours passing until the last wounded survivor 
was removed from the school for medical 
care. In the years following this incident law 
enforcement has adopted instrumental changes 
in their response tactics. Unfortunately, other 
functional disciplines of first responders, such 
as fire and emergency medical services have 
not universally changed their tactics in the 
face of uncontained lethal forces. Respected 
organizations such as the United States Fire 
Administration have recognized the need to 
alter conventional response strategies through 
practitioner developed operational guidelines 
for active shooter and mass casualty events 
with the understanding that such HTV events 
may be well beyond the traditional training and 
experience of the majority of firefighters and 
emergency medical technicians.24
Paradigm shifts in public safety tactics 
are most effective when a collective change 
occurs across all functional disciplines. The 
aforementioned delay in treatment by fire and 
EMS personnel during incidents such as the 
Columbine shooting is an area that warrants 
constructive analysis. Conventional doctrine 
holds that every functional discipline has 
saving lives as their primary role. Integrated 
training involving all disciplines will benefit 
the collective desire to save lives in the face of 
the full continuum of lethal violence targeted 
at defenseless populations. Police, fire, and 
emergency medical disciplines will collectively 
benefit from critical conversations that yield 
innovative solutions to HTV events. These 
conversations should occur regularly and be 
part of a deep seeded inculcation strategy rather 
than a single joint exercise that yields minimal 
long-term benefits.   
There are examples of fire and emergency 
medical services engaging in collaborative HTV 
response strategies.  In 1999, the Columbine 
High School massacre triggered change in the 
Arlington County Fire Department (Virginia). 
In conjunction with the Arlington County Police 
Department, a fortified and trained group of 
tactical medics known as the Rescue Task Force 
(RTF) was established. The RTF approach 
to law enforcement and emergency medical 
service integration utilizes police as cover for 
medics for entry within a “warm zone” to treat 
injured victims with live saving tactics that have 
proven effective when used by the military in 
wartime environments.25 The RTF concept has 
evolved over the years and it remains a highly 
desirable multidisciplinary response model for 
other jurisdictions to study and adopt.  
First responders in Arlington County have 
embraced the difficult but necessary process 
of redefining their cultural and operational 
identities. The training and tactics that these 
professionals receive enhances their ability 
to coordinate, cooperate, resolve, contain, 
and mitigate the effects of a HTV. Rather 
than use the reality of constricting budgets as 
an excuse not to make the needed changes, 
Arlington County has recognized that building 
cooperative emergency service teams leads to a 
more economical and effective life saving force.
Development of an interdisciplinary 
response mindset is the essential first step. This 
mindset should be reflected in written plans 
and agreements, reinforced through regular 
meetings, and practiced during exercises and 
actual emergencies.26 This collective versus 
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functional mindset requires a collaborative 
transition process and a significant change 
to each of the police, fire, and EMS cultures. 
According to a study by Stinchcomb and 
Ordaz on the merger of police and fire into 
one organization, “because the influence of 
culture tends to exceed the regulatory capacity 
of conventional policies and procedures, 
it can become a significant make-or-break 
factor in achieving organizational change.”27 
It is important to note that the historical and 
cultural artifacts of each emergency service 
discipline are not discarded; instead each 
group maintains their rich history but with a 
new outlook that recognizes the practical utility 
of dynamic collaboration.   
While the event in Columbine triggered a 
profound change in police response, it has had 
less of an impact in the fire and emergency medical 
communities. Best practices for collaboration, 
such as those employed in Arlington, Virginia 
should serve as an example to prepare other 
communities to address HTV events. Effective 
training programs and response protocols take 
years to develop and usually are derived from 
a tragic event. Unfortunately, this means that 
many public safety professionals are training 
for past events rather than taking steps to deter 
future ones. The 9/11 Commission Report 
underscored the inherent risk of permitting a 
“failure of imagination” to prepare for future 
threats – such as a HTV event. First responders 
must not fall prey to failures of imagination 
or parochial response strategies when faced 
with an HTV event. Minimizing the effect and 
lethality of an attacker will require rapid Whole 
of Community responders working as one 
team rather than a series of domain specific 
teams. The first responder profession involves 
a continual learning experience because those 
who want to do harm to the world are forever 
finding new ways to accomplish their missions.
WHOLE COMMUNITY
Whole Community suggests that shared 
understanding of community risks, needs, and 
capabilities leads to an increase in resources 
through the empowerment of community 
members.28 While specifically used to address 
national disasters, the approach is not a new 
concept. Sir Robert Peel, the founder of modern 
policing, established “principles of policing” 
when he organized the London Metropolitan 
Police Service in 1829. Peel’s principles focused 
on the constabulary’s dependent relationship 
with the community. Peel recognized that 
willing cooperation by the public with the 
police should be actively cultivated at all times. 
The private sector is an integral component of 
the whole community when it comes to a HTV 
event. This influential sector provides a diversity 
and breadth of assets and capabilities that are 
not fully recognized by the first responder 
community. By utilizing the private sector, 
first responders develop a “megacommunity” 
of organizations whose leaders and members 
have deliberately come together to achieve 
goals that could not and have not been achieved 
alone. Due to their fiscal and political exposure, 
private entities are vital stakeholders in the 
Whole Community model that is impacted by 
manmade disasters that include the types of 
HTV attacks experienced recently in Boston 
and Nairobi.      
SUMMARY
Effective responses to HTV events hinge on 
integrated public safety professionals applying 
finely tuned skills to perform essential tasks 
cooperatively in a lethal multi-hazards 
environment. Joint planning, training, and 
understanding across disciplines are required 
to more efficiently neutralize chaos and 
confusion during the initial response to a HTV 
incident scene. The men and women on duty at 
the time of a HTV event must be an empowered 
and educated first line of defense. Multi-
discipline Quick Reaction Forces of line level 
personnel will be called upon to confront armed 
adversaries, fight fires, breach barricades, and 
negotiate explosive traps all while trying to 
rescue the survivors and treat the wounded.
The first few minutes of any emergency call 
for service are the most lethal for both innocent 
victims and first responders. It is common for 
both groups to be the initial targets of a HTV 
attack. Quick identification and recognition 
of a HTV incident expedites the process 
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through which first responders request and 
receive the appropriate resources to engage 
the threat. Minimizing the damage inflicted 
by a determined attacker can pivot on a rapid 
recognition by all responders that a call for 
service is not a routine gun call, structure fire, 
or medical request.
The concept behind the term “Hybrid 
Targeted Violence” is intended to foster 
a collective change in mind-set to all first 
responder disciplines. Achieving that change 
through multi-discipline training and education 
will shorten the reaction time between attack 
initiation and neutralization through a Whole 
Community response.29 Creative strategies, 
such as the insertion of a deliberately set fire in 
an active shooter training scenario can facilitate 
higher levels of preparedness with minimal 
impact on finite training budgets. The reality 
of a complex conventional weapons attack (i.e., 
Mumbai 2008) occurring again, especially in 
the United States, must be contemplated when 
developing resilience strategies.30
When lives are being lost to a HTV attacker 
during those initial few seconds, first responders 
must be capable of abandoning routine response 
strategies and adopting synergistic strategies. 
This paradigm shift will maximize lifesaving 
forces in the face of danger that is seemingly 
unimaginable. Ready, resilient, and resourced 
collectives of interoperable first responders 
are needed to effectively engage and counter 
the unpredictable events that occur during a 
Hybrid Targeted Violence incident.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Tracy L. Frazzano is a Lieutenant with 
the Montclair Police Department in New 
Jersey. She serves as a subject matter expert 
and instructor for the National Center for 
Security & Preparedness supporting the New 
York State Division of Homeland Security and 
Emergency Services. Lieutenant Frazzano 
was awarded the 2011 Center for Homeland 
Defense and Security Alumni Fellowship and 
was detailed to the United States Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS), Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in 
Washington, DC for one year. A 2010 graduate 
of the Center at the Naval Postgraduate School 
in Monterey, California, she earned a Master 
of Arts Degree in Security Studies (Homeland 
Security and Defense). She also has a Master 
of Arts Degree in Human Resources Training 
and Development from Seton Hall University. 
Contact: tfrazzano@gmail.org. 
G. Matthew Snyder is an advanced 
leadership instructor with the Department of 
Homeland Security (U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection) Advanced Training Center in 
Harpers Ferry, West Virginia. He has been 
employed as a police officer with the City of 
Waynesboro (VA) Police Department since 
1992. Formerly a full time patrol officer, he now 
serves as a part-time investigator assigned 
to the Criminal Investigations Division. In 
2010, Mr. Snyder retired from the U.S. Army 
at the rank of Command Sergeant Major with 
over twenty-four years of active and reserve 
service. He earned a Master’s Degree in 
Public Administration from James Madison 
University and he recently completed all 
coursework towards a Doctorate in Education 
at Liberty University. His ongoing dissertation 
research is focused on training and education 
related to hybrid targeted violence and active 
shooter events. Contact: gmatthewsnyder@
gmail.com.  
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 10 Article 3 (February 2014) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Frazzanno & Snyder,  Hybrid Targeted Violence  8
NOTES
1.  Todd Bates, “U.S. malls vigilant in wake of Kenyan assault,” USA Today, September 25, 2013, retrieved from http://
www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/09/25/mall-security-kenya-siege/2868887/; D. Simpson, “Kenya-style 
mall attack: Can it happen here? Smaller plots have been thwarted,” Cable News Network, September 23, 2013, http://
www.kxlh.com/news/kenya-style-mall-attack-can-it-happen-here-smaller-plots-have-been-thwarted/
2.  Department of Homeland Security, Active Shooter: How to Respond (Washington, DC: DHS, 2008), http://www.
dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/active_shooter_booklet.pdf
3.  T.L. Frazzano and G.M. Snyder, “Hybrid Targeted Violence: Clearly Defining Complex Attacks,” Homeland 
Security Watch, February 12, 2013, http://www.hlswatch.com/2013/02/12/hybrid-targeted-violence-clearly-defining-
complex-attacks/.
4.  D.W. Callaway, T.C. Westmoreland, A.A. Baez, S.A. McKay, and A.S. Raja, “Integrated response to the dynamic 
threat of school violence,” Prehospital Disaster Medicine 25, no. 5 (2010): 464–470.
5.  A. Rabasa, R.D. Blackwill, P. Chalk, et. al, Lessons on Mumbai (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2009).
6.  Counterterrorism Bureau of the New York City Police Department, Active Shooter: Recommendations and 
Analysis for Risk Mitigation (New York: New York City Police Department, 2012), http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/
downloads/pdf/counterterrorism/ActiveShooter2012Edition.pdf.
7.  S. Bomboy, S. (2012, December 18). “Huge school bombing in 1927 puts Sandy Hook in context,” Yahoo!News, 
December 18, 2012, http://news.yahoo.com/mass-school-bombing-1927-puts-sandy-hook-context-185608674.html.
8.  NYPD, Active Shooter, 143.
9.  Ibid., 121.
10.  Ibid., 83.
11.  Ibid., 50.
12.  Ibid., 13-14.
13.  Ibid., 175.
14.  Ibid., 34.
15.  Ibid. 33.
16.  Callaway, et al., “Integrated response”; NYPD, Active Shooter, 91.
17.  C.E. Shoichet and G. Botelho, “‘Chaos:’ Gunman ambushes, kills two firefighters at New York blaze” Cable News 
Network, December 24, 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/24/us/new-york-firefighters-shooting/index.html.
18.  Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), “Updates on Investigation into Multiple Explosions in Boston,” October 21, 
2013, http://www.fbi.gov/news/updates-on-investigation-into-multiple-explosions-in-boston
19.  Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), “Law Enforcement Shares Findings of the Investigation into the Washington 
Navy Yard Shootings,” September 25, 2013, http://www.fbi.gov/washingtondc/press-releases/2013/law-enforcement-
shares-findings-of-the-investigation-into-the-washington-navy-yard-shootings.
20.  British Broadcasting Corporation,” Nairobi siege: How the attack happened, BBC News Africa, October 18, 2013, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24189116.
21.  FBI/DHS bulletins are distributed through public safety venues as “official use only” resources.
22.  D.A. Drysdale, W. Modzeleski, and A.B. Simons, Campus Attacks: Targeted Violence Affecting Institutions of 
Higher Education (Washington, DC: U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Department of Education, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
April 2010) http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/campus-attacks.
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 10 Article 3 (February 2014) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Frazzanno & Snyder,  Hybrid Targeted Violence  9
23.  William H. Erikson, The Report of Governor Bill Owen’s Columbine Review Commission (Denver, CO: State of 
Colorado, May 2001), http://www.state.co.us/columbine/Columbine_20Report_WEB.pdf
24.  U.S. Fire Administration, Fire/Emergency Medical Services Department Operational Considerations and Guide 
for Active Shooter and Mass Casualty Events (September 2013), http://www.usfa.fema.gov/fireservice/ops_tactics/
disasters/.
25.  E.R. Smith, B. Iselin, and S. McKay, “Toward the Sound of Shooting,” JEMS Journal of Emergency Medical 
Services (December 2009); 34(12):48-55.
26.  U.S. Fire Administration, Operational Considerations and Guide.
27.  J.B. Stinchcomb and F. Ordaz, “The Integration of Two “Brotherhoods” into One Organizational Culture: A 
Psycho-social Perspective on Merging Police and Fire Services,” Public Organization Review  7, no. 2 (2007): 143-161.
28.  Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: 
Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action (Washington, DC: FEMA, 2011), http://www.fema.gov/library/
viewRecord.do?id=4941.
29.  T.L. Frazzano, (2010). Local jurisdictions and active shooters: building networks, building capacities. Naval Post 
Graduate School, Center for Homeland Security Studies.  Monterey, CA.
30.  R.S. Mueller, III, “Remarks prepared for delivery, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,” Council on Foreign 
Relations, February 3, 2009, http://i.cfr.org/intelligence/prepared-remarks-conversation-robert-s-mueller-iii/p18594
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 10 Article 3 (February 2014) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Frazzanno & Snyder,  Hybrid Targeted Violence  10
Copyright
Copyright © 2014 by the author(s). Homeland Security Affairs is an 
academic journal available free of charge to individuals and institutions. 
Because the purpose of this publication is the widest possible dissemination 
of knowledge, copies of this journal and the articles contained herein 
may be printed or downloaded and redistributed for personal, research 
or educational purposes free of charge and without permission. Any 
commercial use of Homeland Security Affairs or the articles published 
herein is expressly prohibited without the written consent of the copyright 
holder. The copyright of all articles published in Homeland Security Affairs 
rests with the author(s) of the article. Homeland Security Affairs is the 
online journal of the Naval Postgraduate School Center for Homeland 
Defense and Security (CHDS).
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 10 Article 4 (June 2014) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
ABSTRACT
Emergency Medical Services (EMS) is a vital 
partner in everyday emergency response 
and in homeland security. To date EMS has 
not been included in most homeland security 
activities and EMS needs to expand its role in 
this enterprise. EMS should play a greater role 
in disaster response, recovery, intelligence 
gathering, fusion centers, and syndromic 
surveillance. EMS could increase its value in 
homeland security and make real contributions 
with some additional training and protocols.
INTRODUCTION
Emergency Medical Services (EMS) plays a 
vital role in the United States in responding 
to medical emergencies and transporting 
patients. While a relatively young profession, 
EMS, with law enforcement and the fire 
service, constitute one third of the routine 
911 emergency response system. The out-of-
hospital treatment and transport of patients, 
a function performed by EMS, is a primary 
function required at almost every disaster. 
While the response-phase contribution of EMS 
is understood, EMS has can make significant, 
unique, critically important contributions to 
the prevention, mitigation, and recovery phases 
of the homeland security cycle.   
EMS personnel can be trained to function 
as intelligence sensors to identify suspicious 
indicators of terrorism and to report those 
indicators to intelligence fusion centers. EMS 
personnel can also provide medical intelligence 
within fusion centers to help those centers better 
understand the significance of clinically related 
tips, leads, and indicators. EMS personnel 
can also develop and disseminate medical 
intelligence briefs, which inform EMS, fire, law 
and other responders of medically based threats 
to their health and safety. This is an important 
component of comprehensive force protection 
and has been used by the United States and 
foreign military for decades. EMS must lead 
development of multi-disciplinary mass 
casualty response plans and other emergency 
medical related planning and exercising. At 
the county, regional, or state level, EMS must 
form networks of ambulance strike teams to 
respond to areas devastated by catastrophic 
events. Finally, EMS data can be used to 
augment and enhance current syndromic 
surveillance systems to provide earlier warning 
of a pandemic or terrorist incident. 
Background
EMS has existed in its modern form since 
the early 1970s. It is a young and dynamic 
profession. While most people recognize EMS 
as a fire engine or ambulance responding to 
an emergency call, EMS also includes using 
paramedics to provide support to primary 
medical care in communities, and transporting 
ill or injured patients between medical 
facilities. EMS is provided by municipal and 
county-based providers, fire based systems, 
private providers, and hospital based systems. 
EMS personnel are paid and volunteer.  These 
various delivery systems have complicated 
the maturation of EMS, because each delivery 
system has a slightly different perspective of 
the optimal EMS system; some have adapted 
EMS to better suit their core mission. These 
divisions have resulted in inconsistent lobbying 
efforts at local, state, and federal levels.1 As a 
consequence, the federal government has not 
designated a lead agency for EMS, set standards 
for EMS performance in the homeland security 
mission, provided adequate funding to EMS 
(less than 4 percent of HHS and DHS grant 
funding has been dedicated to EMS), nor 
provided adequate homeland security related 
training for EMS personnel.2 
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The Core Mission of EMS
Most EMS agencies and personnel are very 
clear about what their core mission is from 
day to day. Even with a diverse set of agencies 
providing EMS services, what is provided 
falls within a fairly recognizable scope. EMS 
responds to, treats, and transports patients who 
are ill and injured. EMS occasionally responds 
to mass casualty incidents and also occasionally 
to unusual calls such as hazardous materials. 
EMS also provides ground and air transport 
over long distances and generally provides 
a form of social services in the field when no 
other agencies are indicated or available. This 
common ground could be the basis of forming 
a cohesive scope of practice within homeland 
security that could be applied to all EMS 
agencies regardless of what delivery model is 
used. Delivery methods of EMS vary mainly 
because local needs are different; however a 
universal approach to homeland security issues 
could easily be applied to all of the divergent 
agencies to create a powerful extension of the 
homeland security enterprise.  According to 
Michael Petrie, Director and Chief of EMS for 
Santa Clara County, California, a jurisdiction 
of 2.1 million people, “EMS plays a pivotal role 
in response roles in homeland security now, 
but it is also critical that EMS plays a role in 
prevention.”3
EMS Homeland Security Roles 
According to the National EMS Assessment of 
2011, there are currently over 900,000 EMS 
personnel in the United States.4 This large and 
highly skilled workforce can significantly and 
materially improve local, state, and federal 
government’s performance in planning for, 
response to, mitigation of, and recovery 
from homeland security and disaster events. 
Specifically, EMS can be an integral part of 
homeland security through the following five 
programs: 
1. EMS personnel should be trained to 
function as intelligence sensors to identify 
suspicious indicators of terrorism and 
to report those indicators to intelligence 
fusion centers. 
2. EMS personnel should provide medical 
intelligence within fusion centers to help 
those centers analyze medical data that 
could provide indicators of potential 
threats. 
3. EMS personnel should develop and 
disseminate medical intelligence briefs, 
which inform EMS, fire, law and other 
responders of medically based threats to 
their health and safety. 
4. EMS must lead development of multi-
disciplinary mass casualty response plans 
and other emergency medical-related 
planning and exercising, including networks 
of ambulance strike teams to respond to 
areas devastated by catastrophic events. 
5. EMS data should be used to augment and 
enhance current syndromic surveillance 
systems to provide earlier warning of a 
pandemic or terrorist incident. 
Intelligence Sensors
One possible expanded role for EMS personnel 
is in the area of acting as intelligence sensors. 
With some focused training, EMS personnel 
could become aware of the tactics and tools 
of terrorists and learn when it would be 
appropriate to report suspicious activities to 
the proper authorities.5 EMS personnel are 
uniquely qualified to fill this function because 
EMS personnel see many things that no one 
else will see in the course of their duties. EMS 
personnel respond into all types of situations 
where potential terrorists, experiencing an 
emergency, may not have had the time to cover 
or conceal their activities. EMS personnel may 
be the only individuals that are exposed to 
these potential threats before they occur. As 
Petrie observes: 
We go into all locations with short notice and 
without the baggage that law enforcement has, 
we are trained observers, we go everywhere, 
apartments, houses, we are not viewed as 
a threat and we have the ability to observe 
things that are going on.6 
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This type of reporting is not without 
controversy. Some in EMS would say that this 
is a job for law enforcement and has no place 
in EMS. However all EMS personnel are now 
required to report other suspected issues 
such as child or elder abuse. Possible terrorist 
activities could fall into a similar reporting 
paradigm for EMS. In addition, many EMS 
agencies are very much involved in prevention 
efforts. EMS in many areas provides training 
and education in bike safety, pool safety, and 
car seats. Reporting potential terrorist acts 
could fall into a prevention of injury category 
and could be considered a positive contribution 
of EMS personnel to the homeland security 
effort, to the nation, and to local communities. 
Reporting specific suspicious activities related 
to homeland security could greatly enhance 
response to a potential threat and provide EMS 
an opportunity to participate as full partner in 
homeland security activities.
Analysis of Medical Data and linkage 
to the Clinical Community
EMS personnel could identify the clinical and 
operational significance of certain information 
in fusion centers and serve as a link to the 
clinical community within a jurisdiction. This 
is a critical component of force protection.
A qualified paramedic, who is trained as a 
medical intelligence analyst, could answer the 
following questions using terminology easily 
understood by first responders and public safety 
personnel, and distribute that information in a 
medical intelligence bulletin: 
• What is the potential impact to fire, law, 
correctional and EMS personnel if many 
expats from a country with high malaria 
risk travel to that country for the holidays 
then return to our jurisdiction? 
• Do first responders need to take any 
precautions in response to a large 
outbreak of Salmonella or Influenza in the 
community?
• What do first responders need to know to 
provide proper treatment to patients taking 
a new ecstasy-based pharmaceutical?
Reporting suspicious activities by EMS 
requires a proper reporting mechanism 
be in place where EMS reports would be 
taken seriously and synthesized into useable 
intelligence. The most logical place for this 
to take place is the local fusion center. There 
are over seventy-five fusion centers across 
the nation and their mission is to collect and 
analyze intelligence data from all sources and 
then to provide reports back to local, state, 
and federal agencies that would help mitigate 
terrorist or naturally occurring disaster events. 
By contributing to this collective effort, EMS 
has the opportunity to exchange valuable 
information with field personnel about possible 
threats and danger where they work.7 This 
exchange of information provides a chance to 
work more closely with a variety of partners 
in the community and that collaboration 
alone can have positive effects for local EMS 
agencies. Petrie states: “Just as you can’t ask 
a paramedic to interpret the law, you can’t 
ask a law enforcement officer to interpret 
medical information.”8 Medical professionals 
should analyze data and trained personnel 
could determine how to not violate local, state, 
and federal confidentiality laws. Local EMS 
providers should have representation on the 
local boards of fusion centers to facilitate this 
exchange of data and ideas. Collaboration and 
cooperation could lead to more responsibilities 
and the identification of logical ways to increase 
EMS synergy with the other agencies in their 
region.
EMS as the Multi-Casualty Incident/
Event Planning Lead Agency 
EMS personnel are the experts when it comes 
to pre-hospital care. They understand their 
populations, normal response areas, regions, 
hospitals, and capabilities. They currently 
service all of the medical institutions within 
their jurisdictions and understand the flow of 
patients in normal and surge situations. With 
this knowledge they are uniquely situated to 
be the lead planning agency for mass casualty 
incidents such as terrorist attacks or natural 
disasters. These EMS agencies understand 
current capabilities, how those capabilities will 
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be affected when an overload occurs, and where 
to expect help within their regions. Gap analysis 
can be completed and exercised to determine 
where weaknesses exist and where patients are 
most at risk during a catastrophic event.
EMS personnel work daily in treatment 
and distribution of patient loads and specific 
patient illness and trauma triage. Basic training 
of EMS personnel includes discussions and 
practice of appropriate destination analysis and 
proper treatment to maximize positive patient 
outcomes. Since EMS provides this service on 
a daily basis, EMS is the logical lead for mass 
casualty incident and logistical planning.   
Development of EMS-Based 
Response Teams
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
through the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), should develop models of 
EMS based response teams that can respond 
to manmade and terrorist disasters in a 
comprehensive manner across all jurisdictions 
and boundaries. These teams should work first 
within local jurisdictions, then in regions, then 
in states, and finally across state lines to meet 
the needs by expanding as needed based on 
event type and what expertise is needed.
EMS strike teams are typically five 
ambulances with a strike team leader. Multiple 
strike teams can constitute an EMS task force, 
which provides various support components 
to keep the teams independent and mobile in 
any environment. This model can be adapted 
and molded to meet the need of any specialized 
situation. This model of response could well be 
used within law enforcement teams to include 
EMS in the makeup to strengthen a response 
in an unstable situation that has multiple 
medical components. The combination of 
medical expertise and security could quickly 
and definitively respond to and meet the needs 
of victims while keeping all responders safe and 
law enforcement healthy. EMS components in 
all types of search and rescue are necessary 
since it is never known when treatment and 
transport of victims will be demanded. EMS 
involvement in all types of responding teams 
in disasters provides not only direct medical 
care for victims, but also a peace of mind 
for responders that are outside of normal, 
conventional environments and are exposed to 
a variety of hazardous conditions. Immediate 
medical care, treatment, health safety, and 
more are critical to all disaster missions and 
EMS is the conduit to including all of those 
components in a response team. 
With proper networking, all of these 
response teams could form a strong system 
of local, regional, statewide, and national 
response that is expandable as needed and 
could easily be collapsed as the disaster is 
controlled. Use of Incident Command and other 
common principles combined with a common 
training model across jurisdictions could 
provide the needed coordination protocols to 
make response seamless. DHS through FEMA 
is the logical agency to coordinate nationwide 
implementation of this neighbor-helping-
neighbor model using current EMS resources.
EMS Role in Data Management and 
Analysis
One last area of EMS participation is with its 
data.9 EMS data received from dispatch, run 
reports, and directly from field personnel could 
provide invaluable insight into a developing 
terrorist attack or pandemic event.10 EMS 
data could shed light on a trend that indicates 
a needed action to mitigate a circumstance to 
reduce death or injury. EMS collects data that 
no other agency does. This data is unique and 
can be applied to other analysis to create a 
clearer picture of a possible developing event. 
An example would be looking for a series 
of symptoms that include fever, nausea, and 
vomiting at unusual levels. If an EMS system’s 
normal level of these symptoms are five a 
day and suddenly there have been ten sets of 
these symptoms in the last hour, this could be 
an indicator of unusual activity.11. Computer 
software is available that can sit in the 
background and monitor EMS data to provide 
a syndromic surveillance solution that would 
give an early warning of possible threats. This 
software could be preset to monitor specific data 
points linked to a biological or chemical attack 
or a naturally occurring disease process.12 Each 
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individual EMS crew working a regular shift 
might not see a trend in the making; however 
the software might see a trend developing 
before any individual would notice. Many 
parameters such as response times or patient 
drop times could be monitored, but the ones 
most valuable to homeland security efforts 
would be those related to the types of calls EMS 
is dispatched to and the symptoms patients are 
experiencing.13 Data would need to be collected 
in aggregate form so that individual protected 
patient information is not disclosed. All aspects 
of patient privacy must be addressed.14
New EMS Roles in Disaster 
Recovery
After the initial phase of a disaster occurs, many 
times the function of EMS response diminishes 
and EMS personnel have few roles in recovery. 
EMS agencies should look for new ways to 
integrate into recovery efforts and improve the 
overall quality of life in their communities.15 One 
possible area of involvement would be damage 
assessment. Damage assessment teams would 
benefit from paramedic involvement in many 
ways. First, if patients are discovered during 
assessment, treatment can begin immediately. 
Next, EMS personnel are trained and many 
are experienced at some level of safety and 
hazard assessment. With a little more training, 
this knowledge and experience could supply 
valuable insights into potential hazards and 
possible solutions for health related issues. 
Other roles in recovery should also be explored 
such as providing a variety of health services 
in the community, from wound care to 
immunizations post disaster. The skills of EMS 
personnel are many and ways to utilize those 
skills appropriately should be explored. EMS 
personnel could help their local communities 
recover faster from a disaster and provide 
specific help in the field where no other help 
exists.
CONCLUSION
EMS has demonstrated its ability to expand 
its role in many ways in healthcare delivery. 
Homeland security is another area where EMS 
must be involved fully. EMS is one of the three 
main response agencies notified when 911 is 
called, along with fire and law enforcement. In 
order for EMS to be recognized as a valuable 
partner in homeland security, EMS needs 
to find creative ways to provide real services 
to the homeland security community that 
make a difference and provide value. With 
a workforce of nearly 900,000, EMS has 
trained, professional personnel in all corners 
of the nation and with a little more training, a 
little more equipment, and a positive attitude, 
EMS stands to improve homeland security 
response and improve the quality of life of 
citizens served. EMS is the logical choice to 
perform these homeland security functions 
and to perform them well. Accepting expanded 
roles in homeland security could increase 
needed funding and provide more respect for 
a discipline that is well deserving and ready to 
meet the challenge of a changing world.
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ABSTRACT
This essay argues for the importance of either 
creating a new alert system or changing the 
criteria of the current Emergency Alert System. 
Such an alert system is critical in assisting 
emergency managers and law enforcement 
personnel with communicating safety and 
security concerns. To use the current system, 
local and state government officials must 
complete the Integrated Public Alert and 
Warning System (PAWS) process.
INTRODUCTION
The Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) and other federal organizations such 
as the National Weather Service (NWS) have 
access cell phone alert system. But this access 
requires local and state municipalities to 
become accredited by the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) before they can 
be authorized to use the system. Due to the 
delay in the accreditation process, local/state 
governments and even education centers have 
started or created their own emergency alert 
systems with mobile and internet capabilities. 
This creates a redundant system, which is can 
be beneficial but can also lead to information 
fratricide by reporting inconsistencies or over-
reporting. This redundant system also has 
drawbacks; for example, subscribers may use 
a particular service from a school or town, 
but an adjacent school or town reports an 
incident using a different service. In the end, 
the subscriber concerned does not receive 
a notification. For a multitude of reasons, 
local and state government officials must be 
accredited and have access to transmit and 
notify citizens on the national alert system. This 
essay discusses the background and creation 
of the national alert system, the Integrated 
Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS), 
and the need for local and state government 
officials and emergency managers to access and 
transmit on the IPAWS.   
Background and Creation of the 
National Alert System
The National Weather Service (NWS) 
frequently sends out Wireless Emergency Alerts 
(WEA) about “weather watches, warnings and 
advisories from both the Common Alerting 
Protocol (CAP) and Atom Syndication Format 
(ATOM) through the Emergency Alert System 
(EAS).”1 According to the NWS these alerts can 
be “used to launch Internet messages, trigger 
alerting systems, feed mobile device (e.g., cell 
phone/smart phone and tablet) applications, 
news feeds, television text captions, highway 
sign messages, and synthesized voice over 
automated telephone calls or radio broadcasts.”2 
They can also be specifically targeted to mobile 
devices operating in a certain geographical 
location or receiving signals from certain cell 
towers. 
Rather than build a new communication 
platforms, the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) leveraged and improve the 
existing National Weather Service (NWS) 
system for emergency management purposes. 
On June 26, 2006, Executive Order 13407 
authorized the Secretary of Homeland Security 
to: 
Establish or adopt, as appropriate, common 
alerting and warning protocols, standards, 
terminology, and operating procedures for 
the public alert and warning system to enable 
interoperability and the secure delivery 
of coordinated messages to the American 
people through as many communication 
pathways as practicable, taking account of 
Federal Communications Commission rules 
as provided by law.3
Leveraging Emergency Notification Alerts
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This Executive Order created the Integrated 
Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS) 
program, which enables the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) DHS to alert 
and warn US citizens, protecting property 
and preserving life through the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC).   
The Integrated Public Alert and 
Warning System (IPAWS)
With the recent increase in violent crimes 
inflicting mass casualties or panic, destructive 
weather incidents, or other hazardous 
emergencies, disseminating timely and accurate 
information must be the responsibility of local 
government officials. Currently, both local 
and state government organizations must be 
authenticated by FEMA before they can use the 
Integrated Public Alert and Warning System 
(IPAWS) or transmit using its software. “As of 
January 2013, 93 public-alerting authorities, 18 
including those in at least 35 states, have gone 
through the necessary authentication steps 
with FEMA to use IPAWS and an additional 
110 alerting authorities have applications in 
process.”4 
During the Sandy Hook Elementary School 
Shooting and the Boston Marathon Bombing 
tragedies, local government, law enforcement 
and emergency management officials were able 
to use IPAWS to send out some critical public 
information. In both instances, alerts ranged 
from a couple of minutes to almost two hours.5 
During the Waldo Canyon Wildfire, Colorado, 
in June 2012, approximately 50,000 out of a 
potential 118,000 residents signed up for the 
local emergency notification system within 
three days in order to receive timely updated 
information.6 
In order to better serve and protect the 
public, emergency management at the local and 
state government level needs to disseminate 
timely critical information to a specific area. 
Integrating the IPAWS alert system assist with 
all emergencies in which emergency managers 
need to inform the public of safety concerns 
and security measures or possibly request 
assistance in solving a crime.  
Reason for IPAWS at the Local 
Government Level 
Emergency response to disasters will always be 
further complicated because of communication 
issues. Communications during an emergency 
can lack focus or contain little to no information; 
or they can provide directions to public safety 
locations, create a citizen reporting hotline, 
and/or inform concerned or affected citizens 
of a hospital(s) patient registry. The goal 
of government officials, during emergency 
disasters, should be to avoid disseminating 
inaccurate information. The reason to avoid 
this is simple: misinformation will be repeated 
and cause more confusion then assistance. 
Emergency management personnel and 
local government officials must be able to utilize 
IPAWS or develop a similar system with same 
capabilities in order to disseminate critical 
information that will save lives or protect 
government/personal property. There are 
three things local government must do to make 
IPAWS more effective: (1) local government 
and emergency management departments need 
to begin and complete the IPAWS accreditation 
process through FEMA; (2) local citizens must 
be more proactive and subscribe to and sign-
up for the local emergency alert notification 
system; and (3) FEMA must provide a clear 
definition, with examples, for all emergency 
alerts, that allows local governments and 
emergency managers through local legislation 
to add specific regional emergency threats that 
may not be relevant in other areas.  
IPAWS Accreditation Process
The four-step process to become an IPAWS 
approved alerting authority includes: using 
an IPAWS compatible software system to 
send the alerts, completing a memorandum of 
agreement with the FEMA for use of IPAWS 
system, applying to FEMA to send public 
alerting permission, and completing Internet-
based IPAWS training from FEMA’s Emergency 
Management Institute website. 
According to a GAO report, one of the 
main obstacles to government officials using 
the IPAWS system is lack of training. In this 
report, emergency managers across the nation 
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were surveyed and responded that they lacked 
training, specifically how to “properly craft and 
initiate a message… as well as make the system 
more user-friendly.”7 Since this GAO Report’s 
findings were released nine public and private 
Universities, nineteen ADA/People with Access 
and Functional Needs Organizations, and 
several other government authorities have 
become IPAWS accredited.8 Making the IPAWS 
system more user-friendly and providing 
operator training for current and future users 
will facilitate the ability of emergency managers 
and government officials to effectively alert the 
public.
Becoming Proactive
One of the nation’s first pioneers of the 
“subscribed” alert messaging system was 
Virginia Tech University. After the campus 
shooting on April 16, 2007 that resulted in 
thirty-two dead and seventeen wounded, the 
Governor’s Office ordered a report be made. In 
the Mass Shootings at Virginia Tech Report, 
Key Findings Section, four of the twenty-
one findings discuss alert communications 
and notifications.9 Virginia Tech has since 
created VT Alerts and the university Office 
of Emergency Management has created 
VTGemini; both systems are multi-modal alerts 
that send messages to inform subscribers of 
emergencies and recommend a course of action 
to follow.10 VT Alerts and other similar systems 
are proactive approaches but do not account 
for people who choose not to subscribe or 
guest and visitors who are in the area but have 
not subscribed for these alerts. In response to 
tragedies and emergencies like the Virginia 
Tech Massacre, many businesses, schools, 
organizations, and city councils created their 
own emergency alert notification systems. 
Some of these organizations require their 
employees, students, or parents to subscribe 
to these notifications; others are voluntary. 
This methodology, although it may not require 
the individual to subscribe for the notification 
system, is still proactive as it informs the 
individual of the alert system and allows them 
to subscribe or not subscribe for the service.  
Emergency Disaster Defined
FEMA currently has over fifty definitions for 
“disaster.” Although this seems inconsequential, 
the reality is that organizations, government 
officials, and emergency managers throughout 
the United States react differently during 
disasters. Without having a standard definition 
for “disaster,” emergency managers or other 
government officials are inhibited in providing 
support and confronting the disaster. FEMA’s 
basic definition for disaster is “an occurrence 
that has resulted in property damage, deaths, 
and/or injuries to a community.”11 The World 
Health Organization (WHO) defines a disaster 
as “serious disruption of the functioning of a 
community or a society causing widespread 
human, material, economic or environmental 
losses which exceed the ability of the affected 
community or society to cope using its own 
resources” and an emergency as “imposed 
by somebody in authority, who, at a certain 
moment, will also lift it. Thus, it is usually 
defined in time and space, it requires threshold 
values to be recognized, and it implies rules 
of engagement and an exit strategy.”12 All 
emergency disasters need these two critical 
pieces: quantification of loss of life, equipment, 
and property which exceed the local level 
ability to respond to it, and the appointment 
of somebody who has the authority to mitigate, 
react, and respond to a disaster for a finite 
period of time. 
With this understanding, emergency 
managers or government officials can place 
restrictions on emergency alerts that are sent to 
the public. Furthermore emergency managers, 
with the help of FEMA, can better define events 
that would require an emergency alert.
CONCLUSION
In order to leverage existing emergency 
notification alerts or Integrated Public Alert 
and Warning System (IPAWS), on the national 
level through FEMA, government officials and 
emergency managers need to become more 
proactive, seek for their organization or agency 
to become IPAWS accredited, and establish a 
standard definition of an emergency disaster 
with examples. 
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The new work Border Security written by 
James R. Phelps, Jeff Dailey, and Monica 
Koenigsberg is close to four hundred pages 
in length and can be considered the definitive 
tome on the topic as it relates to US border 
security perceptions, practices, and issues. 
The work is both comprehensive in scope and 
holistic in its approach. Underlying themes to 
the book are that border security is in many 
ways timeless (e.g., the Great Wall of China and 
Hadrian’s Wall), with past states and peoples 
coping with similar issues that we have today, 
that is, allowing those in who should be let into 
a state and keeping others out who somehow 
threaten a state and its people. Further, border 
security within the work is viewed more within 
the context of a long term defense-in-depth 
rather than just as a linear defense.1 Also, the 
work rightfully argues that short-term border 
security fixes rarely work as planned and may 
actually make a bad situation even worse. 
The authors, all faculty PhDs in various 
criminal justice, border and homeland security, 
and security studies programs at Angelo 
State University, San Angelo, Texas bring a 
wealth of experience to this work. Phelps, 
who also is retired US Navy, penned nearly 
half of the chapters. Dailey, who also has a 
military intelligence background with the NSA, 
Navy, and Air Force, and Koenigsberg, with 
her policing and prison officer background, 
also bring practitioner expertise to their 
contributions. This combination of academics 
with real world experience is very valuable in 
an applied academic work in the security field.
The book is organized into three parts: I. 
Defining Borders (ch.1-5); II. Border Security 
and Transnational Crime (ch. 6-9); and III. 
U.S. Border Security Today (ch. 10-12) with the 
James Phelps, Jeff Dailey, and Monica Koenigsberg, 
Border Security
(Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2014)
Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker
following chapter subdivisions: (1) Barriers, 
Boundaries, and Borders; (2) Border Security in 
History; (3) Border Security Agency Operations; 
(4) Physical Border Security; (5) Maritime 
Border Security; (6) Trafficking: Contraband, 
Smuggling and the Law; (7) People Movers: 
Human Trafficking and Population Migrations; 
(8) Borders, Economic Interdependence, and 
Internet Crime; (9) Transportation Security; 
(10) The U.S.-Mexico Border; (11) The U.S.-
Canadian Border; and (12) The Future of 
Borders and Boundaries in the Modern 
World. Each chapter has accompanying 
endnotes. Front sections include a foreword, 
acknowledgements, and author biographies. A 
detailed index is contained in the back of the 
book.
The strengths of the work are that it 
analyzes today’s border security issues from 
a solid historical basis. No partisan politics 
were detected in the work and so the writing 
does not appear to be politically motivated 
or skewed. The work covers the myriad of 
border security issues as individual and 
intertwined problems, which allows the reader 
an integrative perspective on the dynamics 
of border security. Still, a few weaknesses are 
evident. As a textbook, it would be appropriate 
to have some sort of key terms listing at the 
beginning of chapters or within the text. Also 
missing are review and discussion questions at 
the ends of the chapters. These omissions have 
been noted by the authors and will be added in 
later editions of the textbook. In the meantime, 
key terms and review and discussion questions 
will be provided in the forthcoming instructor’s 
manual. This reviewer very much enjoyed 
reading the various chapters but at times – given 
the clinical nature of the text and the analytical 
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writing style taken – certain sections were not 
easy to comprehend and required a second 
reading to better understand the concepts and 
examples provided.  
The contribution of the work to this field of 
study is that it provides a first look at border 
security as an essential component of homeland 
security. The work is written from an academic 
perspective and not from that of a first person 
storytelling narrative as so many works on this 
topic have been in the past; see for example, 
Lee Morgan’s The Reapers Line (Rio Nuevo 
2006). Except for the contemporary work U.S. 
Border Security: A Reference Handbook by 
Judith Warner (ABC-Clio 2010) – interestingly 
enough also an academic from Texas – there 
are no other textbooks on border security.2 
The Warner text was specifically written as 
a reference resource and offers very useful 
reference material with many chronologies, 
biographical sketches, data and documents, 
directories, and other resources; this reviewer 
strongly suggests it as a supporting text in 
courses on the topic of border security. Of the 
two works, Border Security has the obvious 
edge, in that it was actually developed as a 
college textbook for teaching purposes. As a 
result, this new work will set the standard for 
all subsequent authors approaching this subject 
with a textbook in mind.  
In summation, Border Security is a 
comprehensive and in-depth work on border 
– and homeland – security with excellent 
utility for both undergraduate and graduate 
level courses. It establishes a baseline for more 
focused discussions on a wide range of important 
topics intimately tied to the international 
problem of homeland security. Further, Border 
Security provides detailed coverage of both 
historical and contemporary issues in a clear 
and concise manner for the university student 
and should be considered essential reading 
for anyone wanting to participate in border 
security discussions. Given the size and scope 
of the text, it is fairly priced at $60.00. 
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NOTES
1. The reviewer could not agree more with this viewpoint. See Robert J. Bunker, “U.S. border security spending: Too 
much, too late?” Baker Institute Blog. Houston Chronicle, July 30, 2013, http://blog.chron.com/bakerblog/2013/07/
u-s-border-security-spending-too-much-too-late/.
2. The work by Andrew Staniforth and Police National Legal Database (PNLD), Blackstone’s Handbook of Ports & 
Border Security Paperback (Oxford 2013) also has a lot of merit but is UK focused and far more applied in nature. It 
is meant for UK police officers engaging in port and border security duties and as a result is more of a training, rather 
than an educational, resource.
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The terrorist siege of the Grand Mosque at 
Mecca in Saudi Arabia between November 
20 and December 4, 1979 has been relegated 
to a footnote in the American historical 
consciousness. The siege was sandwiched 
between the beginning of both the U.S. 
Iranian Embassy hostage crisis, which 
began on November 4, 1979, and the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan on December 24th 
of the same year. The details surrounding 
the unprecedented attack on Islam’s holiest 
mosque reveal information that foreshadows 
the deadly brand of global terrorism which 
rose from the fundamentalist Wahhabi Sunni 
Islamic tradition of Saudi Arabia and threatens 
the United States to this day. The Siege of Mecca 
by Yaroslav Trofimov is a well-researched and 
insightful account of the extraordinary events 
in which over 200 Islamic militants took the 
holiest site in the Muslim faith by the force of 
arms.
The Fedayeen style assault on Mecca served 
as a rough blueprint for the Mumbai attack 
in November 2008, the Mehran Naval air 
station attack in Pakistan during May 2011, the 
Intercontinental Hotel attack in Afghanistan 
in June 2011, the attack by 100 militants on a 
police station in Pakistan in October 2012, and 
the attack on the Westgate Mall in Kenya in 
September 2013. It seems that old has become 
new again and analysts indicate that small 
unit-small arms type attacks will be among 
the most preferred terrorist attack methods 
of the future.1 Unlike other countries where 
elite military units respond to these attacks, 
American police officers will be tasked with an 
effective initial response to a small unit-small 
arms attack in the United States. The Siege of 
Mecca is an excellent account of the terrorist 
uprising at Mecca, which presents valuable 
lessons for both American law enforcement and 
the greater homeland security community.
The Siege of Mecca by Yaroslav Trofimov
(New York: Doubleday, 2007)  
Reviewed by Matthew Magolan
Trofimov has covered Saudi Arabia for the 
Wall Street Journal since 1999 and his ability 
to explain the greater context of the siege is 
evident. The author effortlessly weaves history, 
politics, religion, sociology and the event itself 
into a cohesive narrative that reads more like 
an action thriller than the genuine work of 
investigative journalism that it is.  Juhayman 
al Uteybi, a charismatic preacher in madrassas 
(Islamic schools) in Saudi Arabia, was the 
mastermind behind the plot. Juhayman 
began teaching in state sponsored madrassas 
spreading the doctrine of Wahhabi Sunni Islam, 
but became disenfranchised when the western-
influenced modernization of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia was contradictory to the spare 
and puritanical teachings of this tradition. 
Juhayman first attempts to enlist his own 
teachers from the Ulema (a body of clerics who 
direct the spiritual and moral compass of Saudi 
Arabia) to publicly recognize the hypocrisy of 
the Royal Family. When he is rebuffed by the 
Ulema and their realpolitik attitude toward the 
Royal Family, Juhayman believes that they too 
are hypocrites and sets off on his violent path.
The narrative of Juhayman’s descent into 
violent anti-establishment Islamic radicalism 
reads similarly to that of domestic serial bomber 
Eric Rudolph’s downward spiral into violent 
anti-establishment Army of God Christian 
radicalism.2 A poignant point, for me, was that 
radicalism is radicalism no matter which Book 
it comes from. The warning signs and mentality 
are doppelgänger profiles on opposite sides of 
the same coin. The madrassas in Saudi Arabia 
where Juhayman taught were fertile grounds 
for him to recruit devout acolytes. Young men 
raised in the Wahhabi tradition and conscious 
of the obvious incongruity between the Wahhabi 
lip service of the Royal Family with the cover of 
the Ulema and the reality of their actions. From 
these committed madrassa students, many of 
whom had been tactically trained in the Saudi 
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Arabian National Guard, Juhayman built his 
Fedayeen army.
The book tackles the quandary of the duality 
of the Saudi Arabian state: on one hand, a 
staunch political ally of the United States and 
much of the modern West, but, on the other 
hand, the premier worldwide conduit of radical 
Wahhabi Sunni Islamic beliefs which call 
for the destruction of the non-Sunni world. 
Trofimov paints a vivid portrait of the history of 
Saudi Arabia. Beginning with nomadic Bedouin 
origins in the Nejd, he follows the rise and fall 
of conquerors, kings and scoundrels, ending, 
finally, with the rise of al Saud and the modern 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Sunni populace 
of Saudi Arabia is torn between allegiance to 
the Al Saud family and the Quran as interpreted 
by the ultra-fundamentalist Ulema. Trofimov 
connects the dots of this complex history in a 
descriptive narrative.
Much of Juhayman’s anti-Royal Family 
sentiment was initially stoked by the Ulema who 
often questioned, but never overtly challenged, 
the Saudi Royal Family. In an interesting plot 
twist of the siege, the Saudi Royals must bargain 
with the Ulema to gain a fatwa (ruling) that 
will allow the Saudi government to attack the 
terrorists in Mecca, even though it is forbidden 
to carry weapons or fight in Mecca according 
to the hadith (sayings of the Prophet). The 
end result of the need for the fatwa was that 
the Ulema used its leverage to exact a promise 
from the Saudi government to pay billions of 
petro-dollars toward more madrassas. These 
new madrassas would spread even more of the 
same fiery Wahhabi fundamentalist Islamic 
rhetoric that created the siege in the first place: 
an ironic state of affairs that would create far-
reaching ramifications felt to this very day. 
Juhayman believed he had the full force 
of the hadith behind him. Juhayman and his 
men believed that one of his men, Mohammad 
Abdullah al Quraysh, was the Mahdi, an 
invincible Islamic redeemer who, according 
to Islamic lore, will lead Muslins to an ideal 
Islamic world after an apocalyptic clash with 
the forces of evil (including all non-believers). 
This apocalyptic belief was the final push for 
Juhayman and his men to take over the mosque. 
The House of al Saud had to re-take the mosque 
to save face among the Islamic world at large.
The Saudi government forces were handed 
defeat after defeat in battle after battle with 
Juhayman’s small army, who were motivated 
by religious fervor, tactically trained and in 
defensive positions throughout the fortress-like 
mosque. Only when the armored brigades of 
the Saudi Army used M113 armored personnel 
carriers, artillery, and TOW missiles did the 
Saudi government forces gain even a foothold in 
the courtyard on the ground level of the Grand 
Mosque. This was only after more than a week 
of heavy fighting. Juhayman and his men then 
retreated to the Qaboo, a labyrinthine maze of 
narrow chambers and corridors underneath 
the mosque where the terrorists would make 
their final stand.
The Saudi forces had poor intelligence 
and inaccurate blueprints for the Qaboo. 
Juhayman’s men, many of whom had intimate 
personal knowledge of the layout of the Qaboo 
from their religious observances at the mosque, 
made the counter-assault a deadly mission. 
Even as the Saudi government tried to tell the 
world that the terrorists had been defeated, 
the fighting raged on. In near desperation, 
the Saudis turned secretly to the expertise of 
the elite French counter-terrorism unit Group 
d’Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale 
(GIGN). Interestingly, Trofimov explains 
numerous times in his narrative that the 
Saudis failed to recognize the siege as a military 
problem, but then seemingly misses the fact 
that the GIGN is a special paramilitary police 
force similar to the FBI Hostage Rescue Team: 
a small misinterpretation of the grey world of 
tier I counter-terrorism units in an otherwise 
excellent narrative. 
After two weeks of outright warfare, three 
GIGN Commandos, acting only in an advisory 
role, finally gave the Saudi forces the tools, 
tactics, and training needed to overcome 
Juhayman’s men. The casualties on both sides 
were enormous. Saudi government sources 
place the rebel casualties at 117 dead and 150 
captured. The Saudi government also claims 
that 127 soldiers were killed along with 450 
wounded. Western intelligence estimates place 
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all of the dead at over 1,000. The true numbers 
will likely never be known. 
Trofimov conducted his research without 
the consent of the Saudi government, which 
still keeps the information from the siege 
classified. The Saudis have even kept most 
of the information about the siege from 
western intelligence agencies. The ironclad 
grip the Saudi government maintains on any 
information related to the event makes The 
Siege of Mecca an even more impressive 
journalistic accomplishment.
Trofimov describes the ripples of 
violence spreading throughout the region 
in this tumultuous time. The US embassy in 
Islamabad, Pakistan was burned to the ground 
when the Iranians wrongly blamed the siege 
of Mecca on US and Israeli paratroopers. The 
US Embassy in Tripoli, Libya was overrun 
by protestors. All over the Muslim world 
icons of the West were burned, destroyed, 
or looted by misinformed people believing 
that Western forces were responsible for the 
siege at Mecca. Trofimov makes an airtight 
case that the siege at Mecca was a catalyzing 
event for widespread contemporaneous unrest 
throughout the Middle East. The book finally 
connects the events of Mecca with the modern 
fundamentalist Islamic threats faced by the 
United States and our allies. The small multi-
national army Juhayman assembled was, in 
many ways, a blueprint for Al Qaeda. Hindsight 
is always 20/20, but Trofimov has found a lens 
that focuses seemingly distant historical events 
into a clear picture of how those events directly 
influence the present and future of international 
terrorism and counterterrorism.
Although it is unlikely that American law 
enforcement officers will see a small unit-small 
arms assault comprised of over 200 attackers 
on American soil, it is exceedingly possible that 
a smaller small unit-small arms terrorist attack 
will occur in the United States within the next 
ten years. Small arms attacks are among the 
easiest types of attacks to perpetrate in our post 
9/11 society. Small arms are readily available 
in the United States and, with the right 
connections and funding, across our border to 
the south.3 Instability due to the narco-war in 
Mexico creates a permissive environment for 
the possible infiltration of individuals wishing 
to inflict harm upon the American people.4 
And with the killing of Osama Bin Laden, our 
fundamentalist Islamic enemies have a new 
motivation to find novel ways to attack the 
United States,5 sowing the seeds of terror anew.
Our enemies have a long memory and infinite 
patience. The Siege of Mecca by Yaroslav 
Trofimov gives American law enforcement 
a unique view into the roots of modern 
fundamentalist Islamic terrorism within an 
important historical context. A context that 
directly influences our current and future 
homeland defense challenges with an adaptive 
and unwavering enemy.
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